United front in Taiwan

History

In 2011, Xi Jinping instructed cadres to "make full use" of Mazu for promotion of Chinese unification. Temples in Taiwan, especially in rural areas, have been the most prominent targets for influence operations as they are meeting grounds for prominent local figures and financial donations to temples remain unregulated. The Chinese government sponsors religious trips to China for Taiwanese as part of an influence campaign.

Starting in 2017, the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots took on a more prominent role in the CCP's united front efforts directed at Taiwan.

According to Sinologist Gerry Groot, the CCP's abrogation of one country, two systems in Hong Kong following the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests "was noted in Taiwan, where it made the work of the tiny minority of pro-unification activists even harder and reinforced the skepticism of others regarding the value of CCP promises." Others have also perceived its failure to persuade Taiwanese.

In 2022, Taiwan's National Security Bureau chief stated that the CCP had provided training to local internet celebrities in "cognitive warfare" campaigns to spread propaganda.

In 2023, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council stated in a report that the CCP's united front efforts in Taiwan through "cognitive warfare" were increasing.

During the run-up to the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election, the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots coordinated editorial attacks against Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Lai Ching-te, framing him as "pro-war"; Lai later won the election. In November 2023, Taiwanese prosecutors investigated individuals accused of recruiting Taiwanese tourists on trips to mainland China paid for by the Taiwan Affairs Office, in which they met with representatives of the United Front Work Department (UFWD) and were urged to vote for pan-Blue candidates. According to a Taiwan security official, more than 1,000 Taiwanese local officials had visited China on junkets in 2023. A Liberty Times investigation showed that almost 30% of the 456 borough chiefs in Taipei had taken trips in 2023 to mainland China subsidized by the Chinese government.

In 2025, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council stated that Douyin and Xiaohongshu are vectors for pro-unification propaganda.

Organizations

Two bureaus of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations and the Institute of Taiwan Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, share intelligence collection and analysis on Taiwan.

The UFWD sponsors paid trips and summer camps to mainland China for Taiwanese youth. The trips are reported to promote pro-Chinese unification sentiment.

Triads and Hongmen associations in Taiwan are also increasingly vectors of CCP influence operations. Taiwan's Ministry of the Interior stated that the MSS operates an "external liaison office" in Xiamen which communicates with and provides financial assistance to organized criminal groups in Taiwan.

Responses

In February 2025, Taiwan's Ministry of Education barred two schools affiliated with the UFWD, Huaqiao University and Jinan University, from conducting exchanges in Taiwan. The ministry also stated it would no longer recognize qualifications from schools associated with the UFWD. The same month, the same ministry banned exchanges with the Seven Sons of National Defence. In March 2025, Taiwanese president Lai Ching-te gave a policy speech in which he promised greater efforts to crack down on PRC espionage and infiltration in Taiwan.

References

References

1. Cole, J. Michael. (2019-12-27). "Taiwan and CCP political warfare: A blueprint".
2. Hong, Brendon. (28 October 2020). "China's Real Invasion of Taiwan Has Already Started". [[The Daily Beast]].
3. McCarthy, Simone. (August 1, 2022). "'Win hearts and minds' in Taiwan and Hong Kong, Xi urges Communist Party".
4. (1999). "Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China". Macmillan.
5. (September 5, 2021). "Beijing boosts influence drive: report". [[Taipei Times]].
6. Cooper, Sam. "Beijing uses organized crime to interfere in Taiwan's elections, and likely does in Canada: Taiwanese official".
7. (2023-05-08). "Notes from Central Taiwan: Imaginings of another Taiwan". [[Taipei Times]].
8. (September 19, 2019). "China's atheist Communist Party encourages folk religion". [[The Economist]].
9. (December 21, 2023). "China wields Mazu 'peace goddess' religion as weapon in Taiwan election". [[Reuters]].
10. (2023-12-29). "The worshippers caught between China and Taiwan". [[BBC News]].
11. (10 January 2024). "China targets Taiwan's temples, Matsu worshippers in influence ops". [[Radio Free Asia]].
12. Sando, Benjamin. (September 2025). "Employing Public Records to Uncover CCP United Front Networks in Taiwan's Temples".
13. Lee, Yimou. (23 October 2025). "China courts Taiwanese worshippers in religious charm offensive, study shows". [[Reuters]].
14. (2017-05-07). "Civilian group from mainland China to take more prominent role in cross-strait affairs".
15. Groot, Gerry. (October 19, 2022). "The Life and Death of United Front Promises From Revolution to (Re)-Unification Past, Present and Future". [[Jamestown Foundation]].
16. Purbrick, Martin. (April 12, 2023). "United Front Work and Beyond: How the Chinese Communist Party Penetrates the United States and Western Societies". [[Jamestown Foundation]].
17. "Some Taiwanese Youtubers on CCP payroll: intelligence chief".
18. (2023-05-16). "China to increase 'united front' efforts: MAC report".
19. "China-Taiwan Weekly Update, July 27, 2023". [[American Enterprise Institute]].
20. Shan, Shelley. (2023-11-29). "Suspects running China-funded tours".
21. (2023-12-27). "First charge laid over China voter tours".
22. Lee, Yimou. (2023-11-30). "Exclusive: China lures hundreds of Taiwan politicians with cheap trips before election". [[Reuters]].
23. Hsin-hui, Yang. (2023-12-04). "Borough heads questioned over tours". [[Taipei Times]].
24. (2025-05-29). "Douyin, RedNote seen as China's propaganda tools: MAC".
25. Hsiao, Russell. (2023-08-23). "Personnel Changes at the PRC's Organs for Taiwan Intelligence Analysis".
26. (July 11, 2024). "Songs, pandas and praise for Xi: how China courts young Taiwanese". [[The Economist]].
27. Purbrick, Martin. (September 5, 2025). "Criminal Organizations as Vectors of Influence in Taiwan". [[Jamestown Foundation]].
28. Purbrick, Martin. (June 7, 2025). "Hongmen Associations Have Links to United Front and Organized Crime". [[Jamestown Foundation]].
29. Pan, Jason. (2017-09-30). "China's ties to gangs to be investigated".
30. (2025-02-20). "Taiwan blacklists two Chinese schools".
31. (2025-02-20). "Taiwan to no longer recognize qualifications from United Front schools (update)".
32. (2025-03-01). "Seven Chinese universities sanctioned".
33. Dotson, John. (2025-04-02). "The Lai Administration Vows Renewed Efforts to Combat PRC Espionage and Subversion".