Revolutionary Government Junta of El Salvador

Background and coup

The National Conciliation Party (PCN) ruled El Salvador from 1962 to 1979 as an effective one-party system. The PCN had diplomatic support from the United States and the CIA trained and funded the Salvadoran Armed Forces. The party maintained control of the country through fraudulent elections, political intimidation, and state-sponsored terrorism against civilians and leftist groups.

In March 1979, President Carlos Humberto Romero had soldiers crush protests and strikes against his government to prevent a revolution in El Salvador from starting, similar to the revolution in Nicaragua which had begun the previous year. The eventual overthrow of Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza Debayle in September 1979 prompted many military officers to remove Romero and replace him with a stronger government which was able to prevent such a revolution. The military gained the support of the US government and organized itself under Colonels Adolfo Arnoldo Majano and Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez.

The military launched a coup d'état on 15 October 1979 and forced Romero to resign and go into exile. Many high-ranking military officials who were loyal to Romero, such as the Minister of National Defense and the Director of the National Guard, also resigned and went into exile. The coup is often cited as the beginning of the Salvadoran Civil War.

First Junta

Three days after the coup on 18 October 1979, Majano and Gutiérrez established the First Revolutionary Government Junta. It consisted of two military officers (Majano and Gutiérrez) and three civilians; Guillermo Manuel Ungo Revelo, a democratic socialist politician from the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), Mario Antonio Andino, the ex-vice president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of El Salvador (CCIES), and Román Mayorga Quirós, a rector of the Central American University.

The junta styled itself as a "reformist junta" which rose to power via a "reformist coup" led by "reformist officers" in the military. During the abolition of ORDEN, the paramilitaries themselves were not dissolved, however, and they operated independently and committed various atrocities during the civil war. Archbishop Óscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdámez cautiously endorsed the coup and the junta stating that the goals and reforms were good-willed.

The junta immediately faced problems from both the political right and left. They also demanded that the junta follow through with their promises of reform and also include wage increases, lower consumer prices, and public trials of military officers who had previously committed human rights abuses against the people.

The leaders of the junta attempted to cater to the left to prevent an uprising by raising wages 30% and attempting to implement agrarian reforms by bringing members of the agriculture and reform bodies together to plan and then execute the reform. Despite ambitious beginnings the reform as laid out failed however some successes did result and Phase I, dealing with land over 500 hectares, mostly succeeded: "By the end of 1986, ISTA had expropriated 469 estates throughout the country." Montero says that co-operative members report: "On March 5th, we went to sleep as poor colonos [sharecroppers]. On March 6th, we woke up rich, as landholders." Velis Polío wrote that: "The reform was an economic, political and social earthquake in the countryside...Landholders saw before their eyes something that they never imagined could possibly happen on the lands that they had always governed absolutely." Overall "Approximately 20% of all of El Salvador’s farm land was expropriated during Phase I of the agrarian reform. This expropriated land made up 14 percent of total coffee land, 31 percent of cotton land, and 24 percent of all sugarcane land in El Salvador. Roughly 31,000 working families, or one-fifth of agricultural laborers, in El Salvador, benefited from the land reform." Phase II, dealing with land over 100 hectares, was delayed until 1982 and scrapped after opposition by hacienda owners. Unlike Phase I, which gave the land to co-operatives, Phase III, dealing with providing up to 7 hectare lots to individual families, was also a failure although land was transferred, "However, between January 1981 and August 1982 37,880 petitions were made and FINATA granted 32,748 provisional titles, 251 definitive titles, paid ₵1.4 million ($560,000) in compensation and received ₵842,000 ($337,000) in voluntary payments from smallholders towards amortisation of their debts." Martin Diskin indicates that by 1984 "only 63,611 have thus far applied" and despite the fact "the present administration of FINATA has carried out its responsibilities with considerable energy, intelligence, and honesty", only 47,001 households (16.8% less than the expected figure.) received land. Regions under military control experienced smoother transfers but widespread evictions by landlords of potential claimants occurred including intimidation by paramilitaries although the military did provide protection and restorations occurred to varying degrees of success. Diskin in 1984 indicates that "the typical beneficiary of Phase III...quite closely fits the description of the "rural poor" done by the AID in 1977." On the other hand Mitchell A. Seligson writes in 1995 that "The land-poor population in El Salvador is defined here as those farming less than 1 manzana (0.7 hectare) of land..." because "...analysis of the EHPM income data revealed that farmers who own 1 manzana or more of land earn incomes that match or exceed those who have steady jobs in the industrial sector." Thus Phase III although not living up to its objectives did ameliorate the land crisis in El Salvador by improving campesino income.

Samuel Anthony McReynolds wrote: Meanwhile, the Army and National Guard continued to kill anyone suspected of being a leftist militant. By the end of October 1979, over 100 civilians had been killed by the Army and the National Guard, but the junta claimed that the acts were committed by forces not under its control.

From 2–5 January 1980, the three civilian members of the junta resigned. The entire cabinet, except the Minister of National Defense, Brigadier General José Guillermo García, also resigned.

Second Junta

The Second Revolutionary Government Junta was formed on 9 January 1980. He was replaced by José Napoleón Duarte, another member of the PDC and former presidential candidate of the National Opposition Union (UNO) during the 1972 presidential election.

On the same day that the second junta formed, leftist groups created the Political Military Coordinating Committee (CPM) to combat the junta and the army. It was a coalition of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), and the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES). Two days later, the Revolutionary Coordinating Committee of the Masses (CRM) was created between the Unified Popular Action Front (FAPU), Popular Leagues "February 28" (LP-28), People's Revolutionary Bloc (BRP), and the Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN). The CRM had four goals: 1.) Overthrow the junta and end American imperialism, 2.) end the dominance of the oligarchy and nationalize land and industry, 3.) Assure democratic rights for the people, and 4.) Raise cultural standards, stimulate popular organizations, and create a new revolutionary armed forces.

On 22 January 1980, the 48th anniversary of La Matanza, the massacre of 10,000–40,000 indigenous and communist rebels by the government of President Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, around 80,000 to 200,000 people marched in the streets of San Salvador. According to the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission, the National Guard killed 67 people and injured 250. On 8 March 1980, the junta approved the new agrarian reforms and nationalized the national bank.

A death squad, acting under the orders of Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, assassinated Archbishop Romero while giving mass on 24 March. Around 250,000 people attended his funeral on 30 March and around 40 were killed by gunfire which is believed to have come from the National Guard. Majano, gave press statements stating that Interpol had the list of suspects in Romero's murder and that he would give that report to the judge assigned to the case, the Fourth Judge of Criminal Atilio Ramírez Amaya. The judge was nearly assassinated when armed men arrived to kill him at his residence. An agenda of Captain Álvaro Saravia was seized under the name "Operation Pineapple." D'Aubuisson was not tried for the murder, nor for treason, despite him attempting to overthrow the junta on 30 April, and he was released from prison in May 1980. He later founded the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) in September 1981.

The Mass Revolutionary Coordinator joined the Salvadoran Democratic Front (FDS) to form the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) at the University of El Salvador on 17 April. The Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) was then formed on 22 May. The junta was concerned of the popularity and influence of the FDR and sent the army to university to disperse the group. Around 20 people were killed in the event.

On 10 October, the Farabundo Martí People's Forces of Liberation (FPL), Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES), National Resistance (RN), People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), and the Revolutionary Party of the Central American Workers – El Salvador (PRTC), joined forces to form the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). The group was named after Augustín Farabundo Martí Rodríguez, the communist leader of the 1932 uprising.

Majano resigned as Chairman of the Junta and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on 14 May and gave the positions to Gutiérrez, but he remained as a member of the junta. However, due to pressure from Gutiérrez and the United States to step down, Majano resigned from the junta entirely on 13 December 1980, effectively ending the second junta. The junta then filed a warrant for Majano's arrest.

Third Junta

After the resignation of Majano on 13 December 1980, the Third Revolutionary Government Junta was formed. It consisted of the members of the previous junta: Gutiérrez, Duarte, Morales Ehrlich, and Ávalos Navarrete. The United States, under President Ronald Reagan, continued economic aid and diplomatic support to the junta.

The FMLN launched the "Final Offensive" to overthrow the government and take control of the country on 10 January 1981. The junta contained the offensive, and by the end of January, the offensive ended in a strategic failure for the FMLN, but they did prove that they were a capable fighting force.

On 17 March 1982, 4 Dutch journalists and 5 FMLN guerrillas were ambushed by the army near the town of Santa Rita, Chalatenango, with 8 being killed in the attack. The attack outraged many, especially in the Netherlands, where people demanded the removal of the junta from power. Duarte stated that it was not an attack but instead simply an accident and that the journalists were caught in the crossfire between army soldiers and FMLN guerrillas.

Democratization

In order to democratize the country, the junta scheduled a legislative election for 28 March 1982 and a presidential election for 29 April 1982. The PDC, PCN, and minor Democratic Action (AD) joined in a coalition and elected Álvaro Magaña as president, defeating ARENA candidate, Hugo César Barrera, by a margin of 36 to 17 with 7 abstentions.

The assumption of Magaña ended the rule of the Revolutionary Government Junta of El Salvador. Duarte continued to serve in politics and became president in 1984 while Gutiérrez retired from military life.

Human rights violations

From 1979 to 1982, the juntas committed various human rights violations and war crimes. Several deaths squads and paramilitaries were formed by junta soldiers and officers that attacked leftist militants and civilians. Because the death squads were made up of army soldiers and the United States was funding the army, the United States was indirectly funding the death squads as well.

The most notorious US-trained army battalion was the Atlácatl Battalion. The battalion committed two of the deadliest massacres during the civil war: the El Calabozo massacre and the El Mozote massacre. Meanwhile, the National Guard, the No. 1 Military Detachment, and paramilitaries that were formerly a part of ORDEN committed the Sumpul River massacre on the Honduran border.

References

References

1. "Presidentes de El Salvador - 1931 - 2004".
2. (2005). "Elections in the Americas: A data handbook".
3. (1982). "El Salvador". Duke University Press.
4. (1984). "Demonstration elections: U.S.-staged elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El Salvador". South End Press.
5. (2000). "Peace without Justice: Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador". Pennsylvania State University Press.
6. Stanley, William. (1996). "The Protection Racket State Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador". Temple University Press.
7. "Presidentes de El Salvador - Primera Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno".
8. "El Salvador - The Reformist Coup of 1979". U.S. Library of Congress.
9. Gleijeses, Piero. (1983). "The Case for Power Sharing in El Salvador". Council on Foreign Relations.
10. Pastor, Robert. (1984). "Continuity and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: Carter and Reagan on El Salvador". Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.
11. (October 16, 1979). "La junta militar salvadoreña decreta el estado de sitio".
12. "Exministros de Defensa".
13. Wood, Elizabeth. (2003). "Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador". Cambridge University Press.
14. Skipper, Charles O.. (2 April 1984). "El Salvador After 1979: Forces In The Conflict".
15. Rabasa, Angela. (2007). "Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations". RAND Corporation.
16. Montgomery, Tommie Sue. (1983). "The Church in the Salvadoran Revolution". Sage Publications Inc..
17. (1988). "Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ugno Biografía".
18. Martínez, Carlos. (15 September 2008). "La tormentosa fuga del Juez Atilio".
19. (1980). "Oligarchs and Officers: The Crisis in El Salvador". Council on Foreign Relations.
20. Medina, Luis. (October 15, 2019). "Hace 40 años le dieron golpe de estado al General Romero".
21. (1983). "El Salvador: Perspectives on a Revolutionary Civil War". Social Scientist.
22. Central Intelligence Agency. "El Salvador: Significant Political Actors and Their Interaction". CIA.
23. Montero, Eduardo. (12 May 2020). "Cooperative Property Rights and Development: Evidence from Land Reform in El Salvador".
24. Montero, Eduardo. (12 January 2018). "Cooperative Property Rights and Development: Evidence from Land Reform in El Salvador".
25. Montero, Eduardo. (4 Dec 2020). "Eduardo Montero: Evidence from Land Reform in El Salvador".
26. Velis Polío, Rolando Antonio. (2012). "La Reforma Agraria de 1980 En El Salvador: Lucha Política: Lucha Político Diseño y Ejecución". Revista de Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales.
27. Browning, David. (November 1983). "Agrarian Reform in El Salvador". Journal of Latin American Studies.
28. McReynolds, Samuel Anthony. (October 1998). "Agricultural labour and agrarian reform in El Salvador: Social benefit or economic burden?". Journal of Rural Studies.
29. Diskin, Martin. (1985). "Agrarian Reform in El Salvador An Evaluation".
30. Seligson, Mitchell A.. (1995). "Thirty Years of Transformation in the Agrarian Structure of El Salvador, 1961–1991". Latin American Research Review.
31. "Presidentes de El Salvador - Segunda Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno".
32. Valencia, Ricardo José. "Entrevista con Héctor Dada Hirezi: "Éramos ilusos"".
33. (1997). "Militarization and Demilitarization in El Salvador's Transition to Democracy". University of Pittsburgh Pre.
34. (21 February 2005). "Political Movements and Violence in Central America". Cambridge University Press.
35. (14 April 1980). "El Salvador: Something Vile in This Land". Time Magazine.
36. Christopher Dickey. "40 Killed in San Salvador: 40 Killed at Rites For Slain Prelate; Bombs, Bullets Disrupt Archbishop's Funeral". Washington Post Foreign Service.
37. Freedman, Elaine. (January 2008). "Who's Defending Monsignor Romero?".
38. Dada, Carlos. (25 March 2010). "How We Killed Archbishop Romero".
39. Wood, Elisabeth. (2003). "Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War". Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics.
40. (1992). "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution". Council on Foreign Relations.
41. Enciclonet. (8 December 2012). "Majano, Adolfo Arnaldo (1937-VVVV).".
42. Goodsell, James Nelson. (20 May 1980). "Resignation threat shakes tottering El Salvador junta".
43. Jung, Harald. (1982). "The Civil War in El Salvador". Centrum voor Studie en Documentatie van Latijns Amerika (CEDLA).
44. Goodsell, James Nelson. (9 June 1980). "Whirlwind of violence in El Salvador".
45. "Presidentes de El Salvador - Tercera Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno".
46. "Basic Law of Agrarian Reform".
47. Rabe, Stephen. (2016). "The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America". Oxford University Press.
48. Pastor, Robert. (Winter 1984). "Continuity and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: Carter and Reagan on El Salvador". Journal of Policy Analysis and Management.
49. McMahan, Jeff. (1985). "Reagan and the World: Imperial Policy in the New Cold War". Monthly Review Press.
50. (29 March 1993). "Report of the UN Truth Commission on El Salvador". Derechos Human Rights.
51. (26 September 2018). "In Cold Blood: Salvadoran Colonel who Plotted Murder has been Living in United States". Zembla.
52. (June 1983). "El Salvador, la lucha por la libertad". Iberoamericanas.
53. (1987). "Conflict in Central America". Harlow: Longman.
54. (1971). "The United States and the Rise of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez". Journal of Latin American Studies.
55. (2000). "Window on the Past: A Declassified History of Death Squads in El Salvador". Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
56. Goldwater, Barry. (5 October 1984). "Recent Political Violence in El Salvador, Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate".
57. Wilkinson, Tracy. (9 December 1992). "Notorious Salvadoran Battalion is Disbanded : Military: U.S.-Trained Atlacatl Unit was Famed for Battle Prowess but was also Implicated in Atrocities".
58. Urbina, Ian. (March 8, 2005). "O.A.S. to Reopen Inquiry Into Massacre in El Salvador in 1981". The New York Times.
59. (22 August 2012). "La masacre que quedó impune en El Salvador". BBC News.
60. (16 November 2015). "La masacre del Sumpul (1980)".