Politics of China

Overview

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the government in Beijing officially asserts to be the sole legitimate government of all of China, which it defines as including mainland China and Taiwan. This has been disputed by the Republic of China (ROC) government since the Kuomintang (KMT) fled to Taipei in 1949. The ROC has since undergone significant political reforms.

China's population, geographical vastness, and social diversity frustrate attempts to rule from Beijing. Reform and opening up during the 1980s and the devolution of much central government decision making, combined with the strong interest of local CCP officials in enriching themselves, has made it increasingly difficult for the central government to assert its authority.

As a one-party state, the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party holds ultimate power and authority over state and government with no term limit. The offices of CCP general secretary and chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission have been held simultaneously by one individual since 1989, granting the individual predominant power over the country. Since 1982, the CCP general secretary has also been the political chief position of China (above the president and premier).

The president of China is the state representative, serving as the ceremonial figurehead under the National People's Congress. In March 2018, the NPC removed the term limits for the presidency.

Central government leaders must, in practice, build consensus for new policies among party members, local and regional leaders, influential non-party members, and the population at large. Even as there have been some moves in the direction of democratization as far as the electoral system at least, in that openly contested People's Congress elections are now held at the village and town levels, and that legislatures have shown some assertiveness from time to time, the CCP retains effective control over governmental appointments. This is because the CCP wins by default in most electorates.

Self-description

The Chinese constitution describes the country's system of government as a people's democratic dictatorship. The CCP has also used other terms to officially describe China's system of government including "socialist consultative democracy", and whole-process people's democracy.

According to the CCP theoretical journal Qiushi, "[c]onsultative democracy was created by the CPC and the Chinese people as a form of socialist democracy. ... Not only representing a commitment to socialism, it carries forward China's political and cultural traditions. Not only representing a commitment to the organizational principles and leadership mode of democratic centralism, it also affirms the role of the general public in a democracy. Not only representing a commitment to the leadership of the CPC, it also gives play to the role of all political parties and organizations as well as people of all ethnic groups and all sectors of society".

The semi-official journal China Today stated the CCP's view: "Consultative democracy guarantees widespread and effective participation in politics through consultations carried out by political parties, peoples congresses, government departments, CPPCC committees, peoples organizations, communities, and social organizations". On the other hand, according to the 2023 V-Dem Democracy indices China was the second least electoral democratic country in Asia.

Communist Party

Main article: Chinese Communist Party

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dominates the Chinese political landscape. Constitutionally, the party's supreme body is the Party Congress, which meets every five years. Meetings were irregular before the Cultural Revolution but have been periodic since then. The National Congress elects the Central Committee and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI); the Central Committee in turn elects bodies such as:

• The General Secretary, which is the highest-ranking official within the Party and usually the Chinese Paramount leader.
• The Politburo, consisting of 22 full members (including the members of the Politburo Standing Committee);
• The Politburo Standing Committee, the most powerful decision-making body in China, which as of June 2020 consists of seven members;
• The Secretariat, the principal administrative mechanism of the CCP, headed by the General Secretary;
• The Central Military Commission

In relative liberalization periods, the influence of people and groups outside the formal party structure has increased, particularly in the economic realm. Nevertheless, in all governmental institutions in the PRC, the party committees at all levels maintain a powerful and pivotal role in the administration. According to scholar Rush Doshi, "[t]he Party sits above the state, runs parallel to the state, and is enmeshed in every level of the state." Central party control is tightest in central government offices and urban economic, industrial, and cultural settings; it is considerably looser over the government and party establishments in rural areas, where a significant percentage of mainland Chinese people live. The CCP's most important responsibility comes in the selection and promotion of personnel. They also see that party and state policy guidance is followed and that non-party members do not create autonomous organizations that could challenge party rule. Significant are the leading small groups which coordinate activities of different agencies. State-owned enterprises, private companies and foreign-owned businesses are also required to have internal CCP committees.

Intra-party factions

Chinese politics have long been defined by the competition between intra-party factions' ability to place key members and allies in positions of power within the CCP and Chinese government.

Under general secretaries Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the two main factions were thought to be the Tuanpai and the Shanghai Clique. The Tuanpai were thought to be cadres and officials that originated from the Communist Youth League of China, while the Shanghai Clique were thought to be officials that rose to prominence under Jiang Zemin when he was first mayor, and then CCP committee secretary, of Shanghai.

Xi Jinping, who became general secretary in 2012, has significantly centralized power, removing the influence of the old factions and promoting his allies, sometimes called the "Xi Jinping faction". Due to this, the old factions, including the Tuanpai, are considered extinct, especially since the 20th CCP National Congress, in which Xi's allies dominated the new Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee.

Politburo Standing Committee

Full Politburo members

National People's Congress

Constitutionally, the supreme state authority and legislature of China is the National People's Congress (NPC). It meets annually for about two weeks to review and approve major new policy directions, laws, the budget, and major personnel changes. The NPC elects and appoints important state positions such as the president, the vice president, the chairman and other members of the Central Military Commission, the premier and rest of the State Council, the president of the Supreme People's Court, and procurator general of the Supreme People's Procuratorate.

The NPC also elects a Standing Committee (NPCSC), its permanent body which meets regularly between NPC sessions. Most national legislation in China is adopted by the NPCSC. Most initiatives are presented to the NPCSC for consideration by the State Council after previous endorsement by the CCP Politburo Standing Committee.

Members of the State Council include the Premier, a variable number of vice premiers (now four), five state councilors (protocol equal of vice premiers but with narrower portfolios), and 29 ministers and heads of State Council commissions. During the 1980s there was an attempt made to separate CCP and state functions, with the former deciding general policy and the latter carrying it out. The attempt was abandoned in the 1990s with the result that the political leadership within the state are also the leaders of the CCP.

Minor parties

Main article: List of political parties in China

No legal political opposition groups exist in China. There are eight minor political parties in the country under the CCP's united front system. They participate in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) but have to support the "leading role" of the CCP for their continued existence, and their leadership is appointed by the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the CCP. Their original function was to create the impression that the PRC was being ruled by a diverse national front, not a one-party dictatorship. The major role of these parties is to attract and subsequently muzzle niches in society that have political tendencies, such as academia.

Coordination between the eight minor parties and the CCP is done through the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference which meets annually in Beijing in March at about the same time that the National People's Congress meets. In addition, there are banned political parties that are actively suppressed by the government, such as the Maoist Communist Party of China, China Democracy Party and China New Democracy Party, which have their headquarters outside of the mainland China.

State Council

The Premier of China is the head of government, presiding over the State Council composed of four vice premiers and the heads of ministries and commissions.

Local-level politics

Each local Bureau or office is under the coequal authority of the local leader and the leader of the corresponding office, bureau or ministry at the next higher level. People's Congress members at the county level are elected by voters. These county-level People's Congresses have the responsibility of oversight of local government and elect members to the Provincial (or Municipal in the case of independent municipalities) People's Congress. The Provincial People's Congress, in turn, elects members to the National People's Congress that meets each year in March in Beijing. The ruling CCP committee at each level plays a large role in the selection of appropriate candidates for election to the local congress and to the higher levels.

Administrative divisions

Armed forces

Main article: People's Liberation Army, People's Armed Police, Militia (China)

The CCP created and leads the People's Liberation Army. After the PRC was established in 1949, the PLA also became a state military. The state's military system upholds the principle of the CCP's absolute leadership over the armed forces, often referred to under Mao's maxim that "the Party commands the gun." The CCP and the state jointly established the Central Military Commission that carries out the task of supreme military leadership over the armed forces.

Legal system

Main article: Law of the People's Republic of China

Nationality and ethnicity law

Nationality is granted at birth to children with at least one Chinese-national parent, with some exceptions. In general, naturalization or the obtainment of the People's Republic of China nationality is difficult. The Nationality Law prescribes only three conditions for the obtainment of PRC nationality (marriage to a PRC national is one, permanent residence is another). PRC nationals who acquire a foreign nationality automatically lose Chinese nationality. State functionaries and military personnel on active service are not permitted to renounce their Chinese nationality. If a citizen wishes to resume PRC nationality, foreign nationality is no longer recognized.

Policies toward Uyghurs

Main article: Persecution of Uyghurs in China

In 2020, widespread public reporting detailed the Chinese government's pattern of human rights violations in its continuing maltreatment of Uyghurs. These abuses include forced labor, arbitrary detainment, forced political indoctrination, destruction of cultural heritage, and forced abortions and sterilization. Critics of the policy have described it as the Sinicization of Xinjiang and called it an ethnocide or cultural genocide, with many activists, NGOs, human rights experts, government officials, and the U.S. government calling it a genocide. The Chinese government denies it is committing human rights violations in Xinjiang.

Legalist influence

Some scholars have drawn comparisons between the current governance of the CCP and certain aspects of the ancient Chinese philosophy of Legalism. As articulated by The Book of Lord Shang, Legalism emphasizes centralized authority, strict laws, harsh punishments, and a merit-based bureaucratic system.

Foreign relations

Main article: Foreign relations of China, Foreign policy of China

The PRC maintains diplomatic relations with most countries in the world. In 1971, the PRC replaced the Republic of China, commonly known as "Taiwan" since the 1970s, as the sole representative of China in the United Nations and as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. China had been represented by the Republic of China at the time of the UN's founding in 1945. (See also China and the United Nations.)

Under the One-China policy, the PRC has made it a precondition to establishing diplomatic relations that the other country acknowledges its claim to all of China, including Taiwan, and severs any official ties with the Republic of China (ROC) government. The government actively opposes foreign government meetings with the 14th Dalai Lama in a political capacity, as the spokesperson for a separatist movement in Tibet.

The PRC has been playing a leading role in calling for free trade areas and security pacts amongst its Asia-Pacific neighbours. In 2004, the PRC proposed an entirely new East Asia Summit (EAS) framework as a forum for regional security issues that pointedly excluded the United States. The EAS, which includes ASEAN Plus Three, India, Australia and New Zealand, held its inaugural summit in 2005. China is also a founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), alongside Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Much of the current foreign policy is based on the concept of "China's peaceful development". Nonetheless, crises in relations with foreign countries have occurred at various times in its recent history, particularly with the United States; e.g., the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo conflict in May 1999 and the Hainan Island incident in April 2001. China's foreign relations with many Western nations suffered for a time following the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre. A much troubled foreign relationship is that between China and Japan, which has been strained at times by Japan's refusal to acknowledge its wartime past to the satisfaction of the PRC, such as revisionistic comments made by prominent Japanese officials, and insufficient details given to the Nanjing Massacre and other atrocities committed during World War II in Japanese history textbooks. Another point of conflict between the two countries is the frequent visits by Japanese government officials to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors not only Japanese World War II dead but also many convicted World War II war criminals, including 14 Class A convictions.

Foreign aid

Main article: Chinese foreign aid, Belt and Road Initiative

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China under the CCP in 1949, China joined the international community in providing foreign aid. In the past few decades, the international community has seen an increase in Chinese foreign aid. Specifically, a recent example is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global infrastructure project that was launched in 2013 by Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The stated goal of the program is to expand maritime routes and land infrastructure networks connecting China with Asia, Africa, and Europe, boosting trade and economic growth. It involves a massive development of trade routes that will create a large expansion of land transportation infrastructure and new ports in the Pacific and Indian oceans to facilitate regional and intercontinental trade flow and increase oil and gas supply.

International territorial disputes

Main article: Territorial disputes of the People's Republic of China

The PRC is in a number of international territorial disputes, several of which involved the Sino-Russian border. Although the great majority of them are now resolved, China's territorial disputes have led to several localized wars in the last 50 years, including the Sino-Indian War in 1962, the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969 and the Sino-Vietnam War in 1979. In 2001, China and Russia signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, which ended the conflict. Other territorial disputes include islands in the East and South China Seas, and undefined or disputed borders with India, Bhutan and North Korea.

International organizations

On 26 October 1971, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 to transfer the seat from the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC).

United Nations

Main article: China and the United Nations

Today, not only is China a part of many UN organizations, it is also one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. A memo done by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission identified Chinese nationals serving in leadership position within international organizations signifies China's increasing involvement in the international arena. For instance, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and so on are all organizations that Chinese nationals are currently in position of (The memo is updated on a semi-annual basis).

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

Although NGO development in China is relatively slow compared to other countries, a Harvard University academic study reveals that China had NGOs as early as during the Dynasties. Specifically in the forms of American missionaries, which assisted in rural reconstruction programs and ideological reforms locally. After the establishment of The People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Mao banned any NGOs that were related to counter revolutionary goals. During the reform era under Deng beginning the 1970s, NGOs although not completely banned, three laws were implemented to keep relatively tight control over them––the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations, the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Foundations, and the Interim Provisions for the Administration of Foreign Chambers of Commerce in China. The latter two were implemented after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, and the general tone of all the regulations emphasized government control. For instance, the regulations require a two-tiered management system, in which before being legally registered by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, a government agency must sponsor the organization; thus, two governmental agencies must be monitoring the day-to-day operations of the NGO. However, in the 1990s, NGOs began to regain momentum despite restrictions in place. Today, the number of registered organizations in China has grown to over 700,000, "... including many professional and friendship associations, foundations working in the fields of education, science, and culture, and a large number of nonprofits engaged in poverty alleviation, social work with people with disabilities, children, and the elderly. The number of nonprofits and environmental education and climate action groups has also significantly grown".

In 2017, a policy called "Management of Overseas NGOs' Activities in Mainland China Law" (FNGO Law) was enacted, which creates registration barriers that, for instance, require a Chinese partner organization to sign on. The reaction from the West has widely been that the space for NGOs to conduct work in may be shrinking.

Many NGOs in the PRC have been described as government-organized non-governmental organization (GONGOs) that are organized under the CCP's united front system.

The All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) is a people's organization and chamber of commerce established in 1953. The ACFIC was established to advance the CCP's interests and promote the party's policies among private entrepreneurs. It seeks to influence policy through submitting proposals to the CPPCC, a process which requires relevant government ministries to investigate the proposals and prepare a formal response.

The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) advocates for workers' interests within the CCP and the government. It also seeks to address occupational health and safety issues and carries on industrial policy oversight. It is the country's sole legal workers union. The CCP controls the appointment of ACFTU officials at the regional and national levels.

Ideological groupings

Various ideological groupings exist in China, often with hybrid and varying beliefs on political, economic, and cultural matters. The "Old Left" support pre-1978 Maoist socialism. The New Left represents a broad range of political currents which are critical of economic liberalization, neoliberalism, market economics; it ranges from Maoists to those who advocate something more like the European welfare model. (Initially, the term was propagated by liberal opponents who contended that there was no fundamental difference between diehard Maoists and the New Left).

Liberalism in China covers a significant range of ideologies. Among others, varieties of liberal thought in the PRC include the liberal Marxists of the 1980s (who opposed ultra-leftism and supported a reformist socialism) and the neoliberals of the 1990s (who sought market reform and contended that this would necessarily increase political rights). Academic Hang Tu summarizes, "[A] common thread that runs through these heterogenous intellectual dynamics is the call for the condemnation of Mao's revolutionary legacy in particular and the abandonment of radical approaches to Chinese history and politics in general."

The term conservativism has been used to characterize multiple intellectual trends, including Confucian revivalists, cultural nationalists, and proponents of realpolitick. A common theme among the diverse trends of conservatism in China is the continuity of the Chinese civilizational tradition and opposition to Western secular modernity.

Summarizing research in the Chinese political context, academic Chenyang Song writes that the left-wing/right-wing dichotomy is not an essential criterion for differentiating Chinese ideological stances, nor is it a pro-CCP or anti-CCP attitude.

Civil society

Academic debates on whether China has a civil society are ongoing.

Within China, academic debate regarding theories of the public sphere began in the 1980s. There is no consensus and academic debates involve disagreements in the applicability of concepts like "civil society," "private sphere," and "state" in the Chinese context. Among the issues is that the terminology developed by Jürgen Habermas was developed in discourse on German bourgeois society. The major groups in Habermasian theory include merchants, bankers, manufacturers, and entrepreneurs, which is not consistent with Chinese views of the "general public."

The majority of research on Chinese civil society from the early 1990s to the early 2010s has been to examine "the organizational independence of civic associations from the state". Researchers have argued that the western driven definition of "civil society" is too narrowly fixed, which does not allow for a full understanding of Chinese civil society. Taru Salmenkari, an associate professor specializing in contemporary China and issues of democracy and civil society in East Asia at Tallinn University, has argued in her "Theoretical Poverty in the Research on Chinese Civil Society" that to understand Chinese civil society, one must "...go beyond the question of the degree of autonomy from the state. It must address the nature of horizontal contacts through which civil society is constituted".

Advocacy

A 2013 study by Harvard University found that while the censorship exists, the purpose of the censorship is not to silence all comments made about the state or any particular issues, but rather to prevent and reduce the probability of collective action. As the study illustrates, allowing social media to flourish also has allowed negative and positive comments about the state and its leaders to exist. According to another study, the development of technology and the internet has also allowed certain civil society advocacy, such as the Weiquan movement, to flourish.

Protests

Citizen surveys

Surveys have shown a high level of the Chinese public's satisfaction with their government. These views are generally attributed to the material comforts and security available to large segments of the Chinese populace as well as the government's attentiveness and responsiveness. Academic Klára Dubravčíková writes that a majority of the Chinese middle class are satisfied with the CCP and are among those who tend to credit it for the increase of living standards in China since reform and opening up.

A 2009 study by academic Tony Sachs found that 95.9% of Chinese citizens were relatively satisfied or extremely satisfied with the central government, with the figure dropping to 61.5% for their local governments. A study published in The China Quarterly on attitudes from 2003 to 2016 found that people in coastal regions were particularly satisfied with government performance.

Survey data compiled by academic Bruce Dickson and published in 2016 concludes that approximately 70% of China's population supports the Chinese Dream.

According to the World Values Survey covering 2017 to 2020, 95% of Chinese respondents have significant confidence in their government. Confidence decreased to 91% in the survey's 2022 edition.

A 2020 survey by Harvard University found that citizen satisfaction with the government had increased since 2003, also rating China's government as more effective and capable than ever before in the survey's history. The survey also showed that trust in government had increased since 2003, particularly following the anti-corruption campaign of Xi Jinping. Satisfaction with interactions with local officials had also increased from 47.9% in 2011 to 75.1% by 2016. Publishing in 2024, academics Alfred Wu et al. conclude that survey data show that Chinese people in all segments of society tend to trust the government.

A 2020 study by University of Southern California researchers affiliated with the Hoover Institution found that more anonymous surveys show 50 to 70 percent support for the CCP, much lower than what direct surveys show at above 90 percent. The same survey found that Han Chinese are more supportive of the CCP than are ethnic minorities and that minorities tend to conceal their views of the CCP.

According to a survey by Pew Research Center in 2020, Chinese citizens are among the most optimistic in the world.

Survey results from 2014 to 2020 show no clear alignment along the left-right spectrum or pro-government or anti-government positions. Wealthier and more educated Chinese tend to prefer market liberalization, political democratization, and are less nationalistic, while poorer and less educated citizens show the opposite trend. This may be a reflection of how the former group has benefited more from China's market reforms.

Summarizing survey data developed from 2003 to 2020, academic Lan Xiaohuan writes that overall satisfaction is approximately 83% for the central government, 78% for provincial governments, and 70% for county and township governments. Lan also concludes that the anti-corruption campaign of Xi Jinping was successful in raising public confidence in the ethics of government officials.

According to a 2021 analysis by Princeton University academic Rory Truex of survey results, Chinese people who are discontented with the CCP typically have socially marginalized personalities and are more introverted, fearful and anxious while displaying lower levels of dependence, sentimentality, self-esteem, cheerfulness and enthusiasm about life, while CCP members and supporters exhibit more traits associated with personal and professional success such as confidence, organization and work ethic, interpersonal skill, and creativity and dynamism. Results from the study showed that those discontented with the CCP typically showed high neuroticism and low conscientiousness, agreeableness and openness to experience, while CCP members on average had very high levels of extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. The survey results suggest that this contributes to the CCP's continuing dominance by relegating people discontented with CCP to the margins of society.

Notes

References

References

1. Truex, Rory. (2016-10-28). "Making Autocracy Work". [[Cambridge University Press]].
2. Mattingly, Daniel C.. (2019-12-05). "The Art of Political Control in China". [[Cambridge University Press]].
3. Tang, Wenfang. (2016-01-04). "Populist Authoritarianism: Chinese Political Culture and Regime Sustainability". [[Oxford University Press]].
4. (2013-09-01). "Will China Democratize?". [[Johns Hopkins University Press]].
5. Teets, Jessica C.. (2014-06-09). "Civil Society under Authoritarianism: The China Model". [[Cambridge University Press]].
6. Heurlin, Christopher. (2016-10-27). "Responsive Authoritarianism in China: Land, Protests, and Policy Making". [[Cambridge University Press]].
7. Economy, Elizabeth C.. (2021-10-25). "The World According to China". John Wiley & Sons.
8. "China: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report".
9. (2009-06-01). "Elections Under Authoritarianism". [[Annual Review of Political Science]].
10. (2018). "How Dictatorships Work". [[Cambridge University Press]].
11. (2010-06-01). "Elections in Rural China: Competition Without Parties". [[Comparative Political Studies]].
12. Manion, Melanie. (2017-03-01). ""Good Types" in Authoritarian Elections: The Selectoral Connection in Chinese Local Congresses". [[Comparative Political Studies]].
13. (2013-05-01). "The Power of Instability: Unraveling the Microfoundations of Bargained Authoritarianism in China". [[American Journal of Sociology]].
14. Wallace, Jeremy L.. (2016). "Juking the Stats? Authoritarian Information Problems in China". [[British Journal of Political Science]].
15. Hernández, Javier C.. (2016-11-15). "'We Have a Fake Election': China Disrupts Local Campaigns". [[The New York Times]].
16. (2021-01-14). "The West once dreamed of democracy taking root in rural China". [[The Economist]].
17. (5 July 2023). "Personal Networks and Grassroots Election Participation in China: Findings from the Chinese General Social Survey". [[Journal of Chinese Political Science]].
18. (1998). "Xian dai hua de xian jing : dang dai Zhongguo de jing ji she hui wen ti". Jin ri Zhongguo chu ban she.
19. "Who's Who in China's New Communist Party Leadership Lineup – Bloomberg".
20. (15 November 2012). "China new leaders: Xi Jinping heads line-up for politburo". [[BBC News]].
21. (2015-08-19). "国庆35周年阅兵". 中国军网 (Official website of the [[People's Liberation Army]])).
22. "A Simple Guide to the Chinese Government".
23. (2018-02-25). "China Sets Stage for Xi to Stay in Office Indefinitely". [[Reuters]].
24. Maizland. (October 6, 2022). "The Chinese Communist Party".
25. (26 February 2018). "End to term limits at top 'may be start of global backlash for China'". [[South China Morning Post]].
26. Phillips, Tom. (4 March 2018). "Xi Jinping's power play: from president to China's new dictator?".
27. Yang, Dali L.. (2004-07-28). "Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China". [[Stanford University Press]].
28. Dickson, Bruce J.. (2021). "The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century". [[Princeton University Press]].
29. [http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/303364/aib775n_1_.pdf "Does China's Land-Tenure System Discourage Structural Adjustment?"] {{Webarchive. link. (4 March 2016, Lohmar & Somwaru, USDA Economic Research Service, 1 May 2006. ''Accessed 3 May 2006.'')
30. Liu, Jingping. (2023-12-22). "Manipulation without Resistance: Consensus Elections in Rural China". The China Quarterly.
31. (20 November 2019). "Constitution of the People's Republic of China".
32. (4 December 2021). "Full Text: China: Democracy That Works". [[State Council Information Office]].
33. "The Development of Socialist Consultative Democracy in China".
34. "Socialist Consultative Democracy_参考网".
35. V-Dem Institute. (2023). "The V-Dem Dataset".
36. "Backgrounder: 中国共产党第十九届中央领导机构". [[Government of China]].
37. (March 9, 2023). "What party control means in China". [[The Economist]].
38. Doshi, Rush. (2021-09-30). "The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order". [[Oxford University Press]].
39. (2022). "Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise". [[Yale University Press]].
40. Huang, Jing. (2000-07-03). "Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics". [[Cambridge University Press]].
41. Zhiyue, Bo. (2017-08-18). "Factional politics in the Party-state apparatus". [[Routledge]].
42. Lai, Alexis. (2012-10-24). "'One party, two coalitions' -- China's factional politics".
43. (13 October 2022). "China's 20th Party Congress Leadership Reshuffle: Stasis or Sweep?".
44. Cheng, Evelyn. "China shuffles leadership committee and retains many Xi allies".
45. Gasper, Donald. (1982). "The Chinese National People's Congress". Palgrave Macmillan UK.
46. Ma, Josephine. (17 May 2021). "Party-state relations under China's Communist Party: separation of powers, control over government and reforms". [[South China Morning Post]].
47. (2012-01-02). "China Versus the West: The Global Power Shift of the 21st Century". [[John Wiley & Sons, Inc.]].
48. Baptista, Eduardo. (2021-06-11). "Are there other political parties in China?".
49. Brady, Anne-Marie. (2017). "Magic Weapons: China's political influence activities under Xi Jinping". [[Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars]].
50. (2023-05-27). "China". Central Intelligence Agency.
51. Wei, Changhao. (2022-03-29). "Explainer: How Seats in China's National People's Congress Are Allocated".
52. Fravel, M. Taylor. (2019). "Active Defense: China's Military Strategy since 1949". [[Princeton University Press]].
53. "Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China {{!}} Immigration Department".
54. "Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China".
55. (5 July 2019). "'Cultural genocide': China separating thousands of Muslim children from parents for 'thought education'". [[The Independent]].
56. (17 December 2019). "'Cultural genocide' for repressed minority of Uighurs". [[The Times]].
57. (28 November 2019). "China's Oppression of the Uighurs 'The Equivalent of Cultural Genocide'". [[Der Spiegel]].
58. (12 September 2019). "Fear and oppression in Xinjiang: China's war on Uighur culture". [[Financial Times]].
59. (20 April 2021). "China cuts Uighur births with IUDs, abortion, sterilization".
60. (2020-06-29). "China 'using birth control' to suppress Uighurs". [[BBC News]].
61. (2019-10-06). "China accused of genocide over forced abortions of Uighur Muslim women as escapees reveal widespread sexual torture".
62. (27 October 2020). "Menendez, Cornyn Introduce Bipartisan Resolution to Designate Uyghur Human Rights Abuses by China as Genocide". [[United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]].
63. Alecci, Scilla. (14 October 2020). "British lawmakers call for sanctions over Uighur human rights abuses". [[International Consortium of Investigative Journalists]].
64. (21 October 2020). "Committee News Release – October 21, 2020 – SDIR (43–2)". [[House of Commons of Canada]].
65. (2021-01-19). "U.S. Says China Is Committing Genocide Against Uighur Muslims". [[The Wall Street Journal]].
66. Steger, Isabella. (20 August 2020). "On Xinjiang, even those wary of Holocaust comparisons are reaching for the word "genocide"". [[Quartz (publication).
67. Ivan Watson, Rebecca Wright and Ben Westcott. (21 September 2020). "Xinjiang government confirms huge birth rate drop but denies forced sterilization of women". [[CNN]].
68. (2020). "The Uyghur Minority in China: A Case Study of Cultural Genocide, Minority Rights and the Insufficiency of the International Legal Framework in Preventing State-Imposed Extinction". Laws.
69. Lin, Delia. (2017-08-18). "The CCP's exploitation of Confucianism and Legalism". [[Routledge]].
70. Patapan, Haig. (2022-11-18). "Legalism and Xi Jinping Thought". [[Routledge]].
71. Schneider, David K.. (2016). "China's New Legalism". [[The National Interest]].
72. Shang, Yang. (2017-12-31). "The Book of Lord Shang: Apologetics of State Power in Early China". [[Columbia University Press]].
73. Eddy Chang (22 Aug 2004). [http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2004/08/22/2003199768 Perseverance will pay off at the UN] {{Webarchive. link. (6 August 2007 , The Taipei Times, 22 August 2004)
74. (2014-02-22). "Ignoring China's protest, Obama hosts Dalai Lama".
75. Dillon, Dana and John Tkacik Jr, [http://www.policyreview.org/134/dillon.html "China's Quest for Asia"] {{Webarchive. link. (10 February 2006 , ''Policy Review'', December 2005 and January 2006, Issue No. 134. Accessed 22 April 2006.)
76. Scott-Smith, Giles. (2020). "The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation". Springer International Publishing.
77. (21 February 2019). "China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative".
78. "Belt and Road Initiative".
79. (May 2018). "Environmental challenges for the Belt and Road Initiative". [[Nature Sustainability]].
80. (2023-07-10). "Contemporary China: A New Superpower?". Routledge.
81. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-03/21/content_548330.htm Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation] {{Webarchive. link. (26 August 2006 (21 March 2006). Retrieved 16 April 2006.)
82. Kent, Ann. (2013). "China's participation in international organisations". ANU Press.
83. "PRC Representation in International Organizations".
84. Thomson, James Claude. (1969). "While China faced West : American reformers in Nationalist China, 1928–1937. James C. Thomson, Jr.". [[Harvard University Press]].
85. Ye, Zhang. (1 Aug 2003). "China's Emerging Civil Society".
86. Kuhn, Berthold. (11 June 2019). "Civil society in China: A snapshot of discourses, legislation, and social realities".
87. (2018). "Civil Society Work in China:: Trade-Offs and Opportunities for European NGOs". [[German Institute of Global and Area Studies]].
88. Fedasiuk, Ryan. (2022-04-13). "How China's united front system works overseas". [[Australian Strategic Policy Institute]].
89. (September 29, 2021). "Free speech risky as China keeps close tabs on its overseas students". [[Eurasianet]].
90. French, Paul. (February 4, 2012). "China Briefing Part 3: Civil society - The land of the Gongo".
91. Zhang, Angela Huyue. (2024). "High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy". [[Oxford University Press]].
92. Hammond, Ken. (2023). "China's Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future". 1804 Books.
93. Song, Chenyang. (2025). "Nationalist and Popular Culture Practices on Social Media: A Digital Ethnography of Chinese Online Fandom Nationalists". Transcript.
94. (2003). "[[One China, Many Paths]]". Verso.
95. Goldman, Merle. (2015). "Review of China and New Left Visions: Political and Cultural Interventions". The China Journal.
96. Tu, Hang. (2025). "Sentimental Republic: Chinese Intellectuals and the Maoist Past". [[Harvard University Asia Center]].
97. Lin, Chunfeng. (2023). "Red Tourism in China: Commodification of Propaganda". [[Routledge]].
98. Salmenkari, Taru. (2013). "Theoretical Poverty in the Research on Chinese Civil Society". [[Modern Asian Studies]].
99. (2013). "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression". [[American Political Science Review]].
100. (2012). "Rights Defence (weiquan), Microblogs (weibo), and the Surrounding Gaze (weiguan): The Rights Defence Movement Online and Offline". [[China Perspectives]].
101. Jin, Keyu. (2023). "The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism". Viking.
102. Lan, Xiaohuan. (2024). "How China Works: An Introduction to China's State-led Economic Development". [[Palgrave Macmillan]].
103. Dubravčíková, Klára. (2023). "Contemporary China: a New Superpower?". [[Routledge]].
104. Meng, Wenting. (2024). "Developmental Peace: Theorizing China's Approach to International Peacebuilding". [[Columbia University Press]].
105. Garlick, Jeremy. (2024). "Advantage China: Agent of Change in an Era of Global Disruption". [[Bloomsbury Academic]].
106. Zhao, Suisheng. (2023). "The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy". [[Stanford University Press]].
107. (2024). "China as Number One? The Emerging Values of a Rising Power". [[University of Michigan Press]].
108. (January 16, 2024). "China's leaders are less popular than they might think". [[The Economist]].
109. Wachtel, Ileana. (January 29, 2024). "When Chinese citizens are surveyed anonymously, support for party and government plummets".
110. (2024-01-10). "Do Chinese Citizens Conceal Opposition to the CCP in Surveys? Evidence from Two Experiments". [[The China Quarterly]].
111. (2024). "China as Number One? The Emerging Values of a Rising Power". [[University of Michigan Press]].
112. (January 15, 2022). "Is there a Political "Left" or "Right" in China? Charting China's".
113. (2020). "Gauging Preference Stability and Ideological Constraint under Authoritarian Rule". SSRN Electronic Journal.
114. Truex, Rory. (2022). "Political Discontent in China Is Associated with Isolating Personality Traits". [[The Journal of Politics]].