Nicaraguan Revolution

Panama (1978–1979)

Supported by:

Cuba

• Dirección de Inteligencia Soviet Union

| East Germany (until 1989) | Yugoslavia | Hungarian People's Republic (until 1989) |Libyan Arab Jamahiriya | North Korea | People's Republic of Bulgaria |Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (until 1989) | PLO Palestine Liberation Organization | Polish People's Republic (until 1989) |Algeria |France |Costa Rica (1978–1982) |Mexico |Sweden (medical support) |Canada (1984–1990, developmental aid) |Venezuela (1978–1979) |Chile (1970-1973) |FPMR_Chile.SVG FPMR

• Nicaragua Anastasio Somoza Debayle
• Nicaragua Luis Somoza Debayle
• Nicaragua Anastasio Somoza Portocarrero
• [[Image:Bandera_Resistencia_Nicaragüense.png|frameless|24px|link=Contras]] Enrique Bermúdez
• [[Image:Bandera_Resistencia_Nicaragüense.png|frameless|24px|link=Contras]] Edén Pastora (1982–1986)
• [[Image:Bandera_Resistencia_Nicaragüense.png|frameless|24px|link=Contras]] Édgar Chamorro
• [[Image:Bandera_Resistencia_Nicaragüense.png|frameless|24px|link=Contras]] Alfonso Robelo (1982–1988)
• [[Image:Bandera_Resistencia_Nicaragüense.png|frameless|24px|link=Contras]] Fernando Chamorro (1981–1987)
• [[Image:Bandera_Resistencia_Nicaragüense.png|frameless|24px|link=Contras]] Adolfo Calero
• [[Image:Bandera_Resistencia_Nicaragüense.png|frameless|24px|link=Contras]] Aristides Sánchez
• Flag_of_the_FSLN.png Daniel Ortega
• Flag_of_the_FSLN.png Bayardo Arce
• Flag_of_the_FSLN.png Carlos Fonseca Amador
• Flag_of_the_FSLN.png Edén Pastora
• Flag_of_the_FSLN.png Dora María Téllez
• Flag_of_the_FSLN.png Tomás Borge
• Flag_of_the_FSLN.png Humberto Ortega
• Flag_of_the_FSLN.png Joaquín Cuadra
• Flag_of_the_FSLN.png Henry Ruiz
• Panama Hugo Spadafora

Nicaragua 15,000

1981–1990:

• 10,000–15,000 FDN

Flag_of_the_FSLN.png 20,000

• 5,000 guerrillas
• 15,000 militia

1981–1990:

Flag_of_the_FSLN.png 60,000

• 40,000 EPS
• 20,000 militia Cuba 3,000 military advisors |340 tanks and armored fighting vehicles | 70 Soviet howitzers and rocket launchers | 30 helicopters (including Soviet Mi-24 gunships) | 15 patrol boats
• 425–1,200 National Guard dead

1981–1990:

• 16,800–18,500 Contras dead
• 5,900 wounded and captured
• 2,000–6,000 FSLN dead
• 500–1,000 POWs killed

1981–1990:

• 2,500–6,500 FSLN dead
• 6,500 wounded
• 950 captured

1981–1990: 32,000–43,000 killed (3,800 civilians reported dead)

Total: 42,000–78,000 killed (incl. 4,000–22,000 civilians) The Nicaraguan Revolution (), or Sandinista Revolution () was an armed conflict that took place in the Central American nation of Nicaragua between 1978 to 1990.

It began with rising opposition to the Somoza dictatorship in the 1960s and 1970s, the overthrow of the dictatorship in 1978–1979, and fighting between the government and the Contras from 1981 to 1990. The revolution revealed the country as one of the major proxy war battlegrounds of the Cold War.

The initial overthrow of the Somoza dictatorial regime in 1978–79 cost many lives, and the Contra War of the 1980s took tens of thousands more and was the subject of fierce international debate. Because of the political turmoil, failing economy, and limited government influence, during the 1980s both the FSLN, a left-wing collection of political parties supported by the Soviet Union, and the Contras, a U.S.-supported anti-communist resistance movement.

In 1988, a peace process began with the Sapoá Accords, and the Contra War ended the following year following the signing of the Tela Accord and demobilization of the FSLN and Contra armies. A second election in 1990 resulted in the election of the UNO, which the Sandinistas lost. The Sandinistas were out of power in Nicaragua until 2006.

Background

Somoza dictatorship

Main article: Somoza family

Following the United States occupation of Nicaragua from 1912 to 1933 during the Banana Wars, a hereditary military dictatorship led by the Somoza family took power, and ruled from 1937 until its collapse in 1979. The Somoza dynasty consisted of Anastasio Somoza García, his eldest son Luis Somoza Debayle, and finally Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The Somoza era was characterized by economic development, albeit with rising inequality and political corruption, strong US support for the government and its military, as well as a reliance on US-based multinational corporations.

Sandinista National Liberation Front

Main article: Sandinista National Liberation Front

In 1961, Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga, and Tomás Borge Martínez formed the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) with other student activists at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Nicaragua (UNAN) in Managua. The founders were experienced activists. Amador, first General Secretary, had worked with others on a newspaper "broadly critical" of the Somoza family titled Segovia.

Consisting of approximately 20 members during the 1960s, with the help of students, FSLN gathered support from peasants and anti-Somoza elements, as well as from the communist Cuban government, the socialist Panamanian government of Omar Torrijos, and the social democratic Venezuelan government of Carlos Andrés Pérez.

By the 1970s, the coalition of students, farmers, businesses, churches, and a small percentage of Marxists was strong enough to launch a military effort against the regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The FSLN focused on guerrilla tactics, inspired by Fidel Castro and Ché Guevara. They launched an unsuccessful campaign in 1963 known as the Raití-Bocay campaign in rural, northern Jinotega Department, where "when guerrillas did encounter the National Guard, they had to retreat...with heavy losses." Further operations included a devastating loss near the city of Matagalpa, during which Mayorga was killed. During this time, FSLN reduced attacks, instead focusing on solidifying the organization.

Fonseca died in combat in November 1976. The FSLN then split into three factions that fought separately: the Maoist Tendencia GPP ("Guerra Popular Prolongada" or Prolonged People's War), the Marxist-Leninist Tendencia Proletaria ("Proletarian Faction"), and the Left-wing nationalist Tendencia Tercerista ("Third Faction"). The latter was the most popular and was led by Daniel Ortega, who eventually became the FSLN's General Secretary in 1984.

Cuban assistance

Main article: Cuban assistance to the Sandinista National Liberation Front

Cuban intervention in Nicaragua under the leadership of Fidel Castro was critical in the military success of the FSLN. The arms, funding, and intelligence that the Sandinistas received from the Cuban government helped them overcome the National Guard's superior training and experience. Castro's support of the revolution at the same time the Somoza government (and later the Contras) received help from the U.S. is one reason why the conflict is considered a proxy war of the Cold War.

Revolution

In the 1970s, FSLN began a campaign of kidnappings, which led to national recognition of the group in the Nicaraguan media and solidification of the perception of the group as a threat. The ruling regime, which included the Nicaraguan National Guard, trained and influenced by the U.S. military, declared a state of siege, and proceeded to use torture, rape, extrajudicial killings, intimidation and press censorship in order to combat the FSLN attacks. This led to international condemnation of the regime and in 1978 the US cut off aid over its human rights violations. In response, Somoza lifted the state of siege.

Other opposition parties and movements began to consolidate. In 1974, the Unión Democrática Liberal (UDEL; English: Union for Democratic Liberation) was founded by Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal, editor of the Managua newspaper La Prensa. The alliance included two anti-Somoza liberal parties as well as conservatives and the Nicaraguan Socialist Party.

On 10 January 1978, Cardenal was murdered, allegedly by the Somoza regime, and riots broke out in Managua targeting the Somoza regime. Following the riots, a general strike on 23–24 January called for the end of the Somoza regime and was successful at shutting down around 80% of businesses in Managua and the provincial capitals of León, Granada, Chinandega, and Matagalpa.

In the words of William Dewy, a Citibank employee who witnessed the Managua riots:

On 22 August 1978 the FSLN staged a massive kidnapping operation. Led by Éden Pastora, the Sandinista forces captured the National Palace while the legislature was in session, taking 2,000 hostages. Pastora demanded money, the release of Sandinista prisoners, and "a means of publicizing the Sandinista cause." After two days, the government agreed to pay $500,000 and to release certain prisoners, a major victory for the FSLN. Revolts against the state and guerrilla warfare continued.

In early 1979 the Organization of American States supervised negotiations between the FSLN and the government. However, these broke down when it became clear that the Somoza regime had no intention of allowing democratic elections.

By June 1979, following a successful urban offensive, the FSLN militarily controlled all of the country except the capital. On 17 July, Somoza Debayle resigned, and on 19 July the FSLN entered Managua. Somoza Debayle fled to Miami, ceding control to the revolutionary movement. His Nationalist Liberal Party became practically defunct, and many government functionaries and business figures overtly compromised with somocismo chose exile. The Catholic church and the professional sectors generally approved of the new reality.

Sandinista government

Immediately following the fall of the Somoza regime, Nicaragua lay largely in ruins. The country had suffered both a bloody war and the 1972 Nicaragua earthquake just 6 years earlier. In 1979, approximately 600,000 Nicaraguans were homeless and 150,000 more were either refugees or in exile, out of a total population of 2.8 million.

In response, a state of emergency was declared. The US sent US$99 million in aid. Land and businesses of the Somoza regime were expropriated, the courts were abolished, and workers were organized into Civil Defense Committees. The new regime declared that "elections are unnecessary", which led to criticism from the Catholic Church and others.

Agrarian reform

The Somoza family had managed to build and rebuild Managua into a large, modern city during the 20th century, but it was surrounded by an almost semifeudal rural economy with few productive outputs outside of cotton, sugar and other agricultural products. All sectors of the economy of Nicaragua were determined, in great part, by the Somozas or their supporters, whether by directly owning agricultural brands/trusts, or actively choosing their owners (local or foreign). Somoza Debayle himself was (incorrectly) alleged to have owned 1/5 of all profitable land in Nicaragua. Somoza or his people did own or give away banks, ports, communications, services and massive amounts of land.

The Nicaraguan Revolution brought immense restructuring to all three sectors of the economy, directing it towards a mixed economy. The biggest economic impact was on agriculture, in the form of agrarian reform, which was proposed as a process that would develop pragmatically along with other changes (economic, political, etc.).

Economic reforms overall needed to restart the economy. As a developing country, Nicaragua had an agriculture-based economy, susceptible to commodity market prices. The rural economy was far behind in technology and devastated by the guerrilla warfare.

Article 1 of the Agrarian Reform Law says that property is guaranteed if it is used efficiently and described different forms of property:

• state property (confiscated land from Somocistas)
• cooperative property (confiscated land, but without individual certificates of ownership, to be used efficiently)
• communal property (for people and communities from Miskito regions in the Atlantic)
• individual property (as long as it was efficiently used and integrated to national development plans)

The principles that defined the reform matched those of the Revolution: pluralism, national unity, and economic democracy.

Agrarian reform developed in four phases:

1. phase (1979): confiscation of property owned by Somocistas and its partners
2. phase (1981): Agrarian Reform Law of 19 July 1981
3. phase (1984–85): massive cession of land individually
4. phase (1986): Agrarian Reform Law of 1986, or "reform to the 1981 Law"

In 1985, the Agrarian Reform distributed 235000 acre of land to the peasantry. This represented about 75 percent of all land distributed to peasants since 1980. The reform had the twofold purpose of increasing support for the government among the campesinos, and guaranteeing ample food delivery into the cities. During 1985, ceremonies were held throughout the countryside in which Daniel Ortega gave each peasant title to land and a rifle to defend it.

Cultural revolution

The Revolution brought many cultural developments. The Nicaraguan Literacy Campaign (Cruzada Nacional de Alfabetización) focused on high school and university students drafting teachers as volunteer teachers. Within five months they claimed to have reduced the overall illiteracy rate from 50.3% to 12.9%. In September 1980, UNESCO awarded Nicaragua the "Nadezhda K. Krupskaya" award. This was followed by literacy campaigns of 1982, 1986, 1987, 1995 and 2000, each of which was also awarded by UNESCO.

The Sandinistas established a Ministry of Culture, one of only three in Latin America at the time, and established a new editorial brand, called Editorial Nueva Nicaragua and, based on it, started to print cheap editions of basic books rarely seen by Nicaraguans. It founded an Instituto de Estudios del Sandinismo (Institute for Studies of Sandinismo) where it printed the work and papers of Augusto C. Sandino and those that reflected the ideologies of the FSLN, such as Carlos Fonseca and Ricardo Morales Avilés.

Such programs received international recognition for improving literacy, health care, education, childcare, unions, and land reform.

Human rights controversies

Amnesty International noted numerous human rights violations by the Sandinista government. They contended that civilians "disappeared" after their arrest, that "civil and political rights" were suspended, due process was denied detainees, detainees were tortured, and "reports of the killing by government forces of those suspected of supporting the contras".

The Sandinistas were accused of committing mass executions. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights investigated abuses by Sandinista forces, including an execution of 35 to 40 Miskitos in December 1981,{{Cite news|title=OAS Study Says Miskito Indians Suffered Abuse From Sandinistas

The Heritage Foundation, a conservative American think tank with close ties to the Ronald Reagan administration, charged the Sandinista government with human rights violations, including press censorship. It charged that the government censored the independent newspaper La Prensa. French journalist Viktor Dedaj, who lived in Managua in the 1980s, contended that La Prensa was generally sold freely and that the majority of radio stations were anti-Sandinista. The Heritage Foundation claimed that the Sandinistas instituted a "spy on your neighbor" system that encouraged citizens to report any activity deemed counter-revolutionary, with those reported facing harassment from security representatives, including the destruction of property. Heritage also criticized the government for its treatment of the Miskito people, stating that over 15,000 Miskitos were forced to relocate, that their villages were destroyed, and that their killers were promoted rather than punished.

The United Nations, the Organization of American States and Pax Christi disputed Heritage's allegations of anti-Semitism. According to them, individual Nicaraguan Jews had their property expropriated due to their connections with the Somoza regime, rather than because they were Jewish. They cited the fact that there were prominent Sandinista officials of Jewish descent. In contrast to these organizations, the Anti-Defamation League supported allegations of Sandinista antisemitism. It worked closely with Nicaraguan Jewish exiles to reclaim a synagogue that had been firebombed by Sandinista militants in 1978 and expropriated in 1979.

Contra war

Main article: Contras

The Carter Administration attempted to work with FSLN in 1979 and 1980, while the Reagan Administration supported an anti-communist strategy for dealing with Latin America, and attempted to isolate the Sandinista regime economically and politically. As early as 1980–1981, anti-Sandinista forces known as Contras began forming along the Honduras–Nicaragua border. Many of the initial Contras were former members of Somoza's National Guard and still loyal to him, then in exile in Honduras.

In addition to Contra units loyal to Somoza, the FSLN began to face opposition from members of ethnic minority groups that inhabited Nicaragua's remote Mosquito Coast region along the Caribbean. These groups were demanding self-determination, autonomy, and freedom from persecution, but the FSLN refused to grant these and began using forced relocations and armed force in response.

Upon taking office in January 1981, Reagan cancelled U.S. economic aid to Nicaragua, and on 6 August 1981 he signed National Security Decision Directive 7, which authorized the production and shipment of arms to the region but not their deployment. On 17 November 1981, President Reagan signed National Security Directive 17, authorizing covert support to anti-Sandinista forces.

Armed conflict soon erupted, further destabilizing the region upset by civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala. The CIA-backed Contras secretly opened a "second front" on Nicaragua's eastern coast and Costa Rican border. As the civil war opened cracks in the national revolutionary project, FSLN's military budget grew to more than half of the government's annual budget. A compulsory draft called the Servicio Militar Patriótico (Patriotic Military Service) was also established.

By 1982, Contra forces had begun carrying out assassinations of members of the Nicaraguan government, and by 1983 the Contras had launched a major offensive. The CIA was helping them to plant mines in Nicaragua harbors to inhibit foreign weapons shipments. The 1987 Iran–Contra affair placed the Reagan Administration again at the center of secret support for the Contras.

1984 general election

Main article: 1984 Nicaraguan general election

The 1984 Nicaraguan general election took place on 4 November. Of the 1,551,597 citizens registered in July, 1,170,142 voted (75.4%). Null votes were 6% of the total. International observers declared the elections "free and fair", although the Reagan administration denounced it as a "Soviet style sham". The national share of valid votes for president were:

• Daniel Ortega, Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) – 67.0%
• Clemente Guido, Democratic Conservative Party (PCD) – 14.0%
• Virgilio Godoy, Independent Liberal Party (PLI) – 9.6%
• Mauricio Diaz, Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC) – 5.6%
• Allan Zambrana, Nicaraguan Communist Party (PCdeN) – 1.5%
• Domingo Sánchez Sancho, Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) – 1.3%
• Isidro Téllez, Marxist–Leninist Popular Action Movement (MAP-ML) – 1.0%

Esquipulas Peace Agreement

Main article: Esquipulas Peace Agreement

The Esquipulas Peace Agreement was a mid-1980s initiative to settle the military conflicts that had plagued Central America for years, sometimes decades. It built upon groundwork laid by the Contadora Group from 1983 to 1985. The agreement was named for Esquipulas, Guatemala, where the initial meetings took place. US Congress efforts were helped by Capitol Hill lobbyist William C. Chasey.

In May 1986, summit meeting Esquipulas I took place, attended by the five Central American presidents. On 15 February 1987, Costa Rican President Óscar Arias submitted a Peace Plan that evolved from this meeting. During 1986 and 1987, the Esquipulas Process was established, in which the Central American heads of state agreed on economic cooperation and a framework for peaceful conflict resolution. The Esquipulas II Accord emerged from this and was signed in Guatemala City by the five presidents on 7 August 1987.

Esquipulas II defined measures to promote national reconciliation, an end to hostilities, democratization, free elections, the termination of all assistance to irregular forces, negotiations on arms controls, and assistance to refugees. It laid the ground for international verification procedures and provided a timetable for implementation.

The Sapoá Accords, held on 23 March 1988, represented the beginning of a peace process in Nicaragua. The name of the accords comes from Sapoá, a Nicaraguan town near the border with Costa Rica. Sandinismo in 1988 was coming to an end as the Soviet Union began limiting its support. This in turn limited Sandinista government options to continue the conflict, forcing them to negotiate for peace. The accord was mediated by João Clemente Baena Soares at the time as Secretary General of the Organization of American States and then Archbishop of Managua Miguel Obando y Bravo Management of the peace process relied on Soviet ambassador Vaino Väljas' mediation (based on recent US-Soviet agreements), since the U.S. did not have an Ambassador to Nicaragua from 1 July 1987 until 4 May 1988.

National Opposition Union (UNO)

Main article: National Opposition Union (Nicaragua, 1990)

In the 1990 Nicaraguan general election, the UNO Coalition included:

• 3 Liberal factions: PLI, PLC and PALI
• 3 Conservative: ANC, PNC and APC
• 3 Social-Christians: PPSC, PDCN and PAN
• 2 Social democrats: PSD and MDN
• 2 Communists: PSN (pro-Moscow) and PC de Nicaragua (pro-Albania)
• 1 Central American Unionist: PIAC

Maps of Contra activity

|File:Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1984).png | |File:Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1985).png | |File:Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1986).png | |File:Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1988).png | |File:Nicaragua FDN.jpg |

References

Bibliography

• Emily L Andrews, Active Marianismo: Women's social and political action in Nicaraguan Christian base communities and the Sandinista revolution. The Marianismo Ideal Grinnell College research project, 1997. Retrieved November 2009.
• Enrique Bermudez (with Michael Johns), "The Contras' Valley Forge: How I View the Nicaragua Crisis", Policy Review magazine, Summer 1988.
• David Close, Salvador Marti Puig & Shelley McConnell (2010) "The Sandinistas and Nicaragua, 1979–2009" NY: Lynne Rienner.
• Dodson, Michael, and Laura Nuzzi O'Shaughnessy (1990). Nicaragua's Other Revolution: Religious Faith and Political Struggle. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
• Schmidli, William Michael, "'The Most Sophisticated Intervention We Have Seen': The Carter Administration and the Nicaraguan Crisis, 1978–1979," Diplomacy and Statecraft, (2012) 23#1 pp 66–86.
• Sierakowski, Robert. Sandinistas: A Moral History. University of Notre Dame Press, 2019.

Primary sources

• Katherine Hoyt, Memories of the 1979 Final Offensive, Nicanet, Retrieved November 2009. This is a first-hand account from Matagalpa; also contains some information on the general situation. Has photographs showing considerable damage to Matagalpa. News and Information
• Salvador Martí Puig, "Nicaragua. La revolución enredada", Libros de la Catarata: Madrid.
• Oleg Ignatiev, "The Storm of Tiscapa", in Borovik and Ignatiev, . Progress Publishers, 1979; English translation, 1980.

References

1. Miriam Emanuelsson. (24 April 2017). "Nicaragua, Historia y Revolución: Así fue la toma del Fortín de Acosasco en la insurrección el 7 de julio de 1979 en León, Capital de la Revolución Sandinista".
2. (1993). "Encyclopædia Britannica".
3. "Origin and Development of the Contra Conflict".
4. McManus, Doyle. (6 March 1987). "Private Contra Funding of $32 Million Disclosed : Leader Shows Secret Bank Data in Effort to Prove Rebels Did Not Get Money From Iran Arms Sales". [[Los Angeles Times]].
5. Williams, Dan. (1986-10-17). "New Light Falls on a Not-So Secret Secret: Salvador's Help for the Contras". Los Angeles Times.
6. Meislin, Richard. (1987-02-28). "Guatemala aided Contras, despite denials, panel says". [[New York Times]].
7. (1 May 1989). "Participation of Costa Rican government in arms smuggling, for Sandinistas in 1979 and for Contras in mid-1980's". UNHCR.
8. "The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations".
9. The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. p. 255.
10. {{Harvnb. Hamilton. Inouye. 1995
11. "CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy".
12. (14 May 1987). "Reagan Says Saudi Talked of Contra Aid". tribunedigital-chicagotribune.
13. (December 1988). "Saudi Arabia and the Reagan Doctrine – Middle East Research and Information Project".
14. "Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs".
15. (2 May 1987). "Poland and China Reportedly Sent Arms to Contras". The New York Times.
16. Landslide: The Unmaking of the President, 1984–1988. p. 143.
17. "Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs – the Iran-Contra Affairs".
18. (22 July 1987). "Iran–Contra Hearings; Brunei Regains $10 Million". The New York Times.
19. Brown, Jonathan C.. (2022). "Omar Torrijos and the Sandinista Revolution". The Latin Americanist.
20. Sánchez Nateras, Gerardo. (2018). "The Sandinista Revolution and the Limits of the Cold War in Latin America: The Dilemma of Nonintervention During the Nicaraguan Crisis, 1977–78". [[Cold War History (journal).
21. {{harvnb. Dinges. 1990
22. ["The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices, and ..."]({{Google books).
23. {{Harvnb. Hamilton. Inouye. 1995
24. {{Harvnb. Hamilton. Inouye. 1995
25. {{Harvnb. Hamilton. Inouye. 1995
26. (February 2025). "Welcome to the Air Combat Information Group }}{{dead link".
27. ["The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices, and..."]({{Google books).
28. {{Harvnb. Hamilton. Inouye. 1995
29. {{Harvnb. Hamilton. Inouye. 1995
30. {{Harvnb. Hamilton. Inouye. 1995
31. {{Harvnb. Hamilton. Inouye. 1995
32. Dickey, Christopher. (19 July 1981). "Arab States Help Nicaragua Avoid Ties to Superpowers". [[The Washington Post]].
33. Echikson, William. (15 July 1982). "France Warms Up to Nicaragua – As US Fumes". [[The Christian Science Monitor]].
34. "Mexico's Support of the Sandinista Revolution". Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo.
35. (2009). "Our work in Nicaragua". Swedish International Development Corporation Agency (www.sida.se).
36. "Sandinistas Find Economic Ally In Socialist Sweden". philly-archives.
37. Bishop, Adam. (2 September 2009). "With Them and Against Them: Canada's Relations With Nicaragua, 1979–1990". University of Waterloo.
38. {{Harvnb. Caballero Jurado. Thomas. 1990
39. Tyroler, Deborah. (1988-01-29). "Nicaragua: Summary Of Human Costs Of Contra War, 1980-1987". University of New Mexico.
40. {{Harvnb. Caballero Jurado. Thomas. 1990
41. [https://onwar.com/data/nicaragua1981.html Contra Insurgency in Nicaragua 1981-1990] OnWar
42. (30 July 1985). "Nicaragua's military is at its highest strength since the leftist Sandinista government gained power from the U.S.-backed regime six years ago". [[United Press International]].
43. {{harvnb. Sullivan. Karreth. 2019
44. {{Harvnb. Sullivan. Karreth. 2019
45. Jung, Harald. (October 1979). "The Fall of Somoza". New Left Review.
46. {{harvnb. Sullivan. Karreth. 2019
47. [https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.TAB15.1E.GIF Lesser Murdering States , Quasi-States, and Groups (University of Hawaii)] Row 2490, 2520, 2537, 2541, 2543
48. Lacina, Bethany. "The PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset, 1946–2008, Version 3.0: Documentation of Coding Decisions". International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.
49. {{Harvnb. Brown. 2001
50. Louis Proyect, ''Nicaragua'', discusses, among other things, the reforms and the degree to which socialism was intended or achieved.
51. "Taking Care of Business in Nicaragua".
52. Baracco, Luciano. (2005). "Nicaragua: The Imagining of a Nation – From Nineteenth-Century Liberals to Twentieth-Century Sandinistas". Algora Publishing.
53. Baracco, Luciano. (2005). "Nicaragua: The Imagining of a Nation – From Nineteenth-Century Liberals to Twentieth-Century Sandinistas". Algora Publishing.
54. [https://diariobarricada.com/2022/10/27/gesta-heroica-de-raiti-y-bocay/ Gesta heroica de Raití y Bocay] Diario Barricada
55. Baracco, Luciano. (2005). "Nicaragua: The Imagining of a Nation – From Nineteenth-Century Liberals to Twentieth-Century Sandinistas". Algora Publishing.
56. {{harvnb. Caballero Jurado. Thomas. 1990
57. [https://socialistworker.org/2016/07/28/encarna-ortega-al-sandinismo Encarna Ortega al Sandinismo?] (2016-07-28)
58. Brands, Hal. (2010). "Latin America's Cold War". Harvard University Press.
59. María Dolores Ferrero Blanco ''La Nicaragua de los Somoza : 1936–1979''. Managua: Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica de la Universidad Centroamericana; Huelva : Universidad de Huelva, 2012. p. 132.
60. Washington, Somoza and the Sandinistas: [{{Google books. 978-0521523356, p. 106
61. María Dolores Ferrero Blanco ''La Nicaragua de los Somoza : 1936–1979''. Managua: Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica de la Universidad Centroamericana; Huelva : Universidad de Huelva, 2012. p. 273.
62. evolution of demography in [[Nicaragua]] (1961–2003), Data FAOSTAT, http://faostat.fao.org/faostat/help-copyright/copyright-e.htm {{Webarchive. link. (19 July 2006 (last updated 11 February 2005))
63. Solá Monserrat, Roser. "Geografía y Estructura Económicas de Nicaragua" (Nicaragua's Geography and Economical Structure). Universidad Centroamericana. Managua, 1989. 2nd ed.
64. "Agrarian Productive Structure in Nicaragua", ''Solá Monserrat, Roser. 1989. Pag 69 and ss''.
65. Louis Proyect, ''Nicaragua'', about 4/5 of the way down.
66. Hanemann, Ulrike. "Nicaragua's Literacy Campaign". UNESCO.
67. B. Arrien, Juan. "Literacy in Nicaragua". UNESCO.
68. [http://www.stanford.edu/group/arts/nicaragua/discovery_eng/history/background.html Background History] {{Webarchive. link. (22 April 2017 of Nicaragua)
69. [http://www.globalexchange.org/tours/NicaraguaReportOct2001.html globalexchange.org] {{webarchive. link. (30 September 2006 Report on Nicaragua)
70. Amnesty International. (1989). "Nicaragua: The human rights records 1986–1989". Amnesty International Publications.
71. Moore, John Norton (1987) ''The Secret War in Central America''. University Publications of America. p. 143. {{ISBN. 978-0890939611
72. Miranda, Roger and Ratliff, William (1993) ''The Civil War in Nicaragua''. Transaction. p. 193. {{ISBN. 978-1412819688
73. (1993-03-12). "Annual Report 1992–1993". Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
74. Farah, Douglas. (2 August 1987). "Miskito Indians Forced to Flee : Their Dreams of Returning to Nicaragua Fade". [[Los Angeles Times]].
75. "Reagan and Heritage: A Unique Partnership".
76. Arin, Kubilay Yado (2013): ''Think Tanks, the Brain Trusts of US Foreign Policy''. Wiesbaden: VS Springer.
77. L., Melanie. "The Sandinista War on Human Rights". The Heritage Foundation.
78. Que faire si vous lisez le journal "Le Monde", Viktor Dedaj, 2004
79. Russell, George. (17 October 1983). "Nicaragua: Nothing Will Stop This Revolution".
80. L., Melanie. "The Sandinista War on Human Rights".
81. (4 July 2006). "Herty Lewites, 66, Ex-Sandinista, Dies". The New York Times.
82. (September 1986). "Sandinista Anti-Semitism and Its Apologists".
83. U.S. Department of Justice, Appendix A: Background on United States Funding of the Contras, http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/9712/appa.htm {{Webarchive. link. (21 January 2015)
84. University of Texas, National Security Decision Directive number 7, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/Scanned%20NSDDS/NSDD7.pdf {{Webarchive. link. (4 October 2012)
85. "Ley del Servicio Militar Patriótico".
86. (5 March 1985). "Setback for Contras: CIA Mining of Harbors 'a Fiasco'", Last in a series". [[L.A. Times]].
87. (5 November 1984). "BBC on This Day-5-1984: Sandinistas claim election victory".
88. "Revista Envío – Sapoá – A New Benchmark".
89. "Acuerdos de Sapoá – 23 de marzo de 1988".
90. "Proxy wars in Nicaragua and Angola – The Cold War, 1972–1991 – OCR A – GCSE History Revision – OCR A – BBC Bitesize".
91. (28 March 2021). "Toomas Alatalu: Vaino Väljas – eestlane, kes alustas külma sõja lõpetamist".
92. "The INF Treaty and the Washington Summit: 20 Years Later".
93. "Paradoxes from an heterogeneous and fragile electoral Alliance", ''CAJINA, Roberto, Pag. 44 and ss.''