National Liberation Front of Angola

History

Origin

In 1954, the United People of Northern Angola (UPNA) was formed as a separatist movement for the Bakongo tribe who wished to re-establish its 16th-century feudal kingdom but was also a protest movement against forced labour. Holden Roberto was to be the king of that land.

By 1958, the organisation's name had been changed to the "União das Populações de Angola" (UPA) under Holden Roberto from São Salvador, Bakongo, Northern Angola. The new organisation was described as an ethnic political movement. It was said more than a million refugees fled the north of Angola for Zaire.

In an attempt to become a national political movement, it merged with the "Partido Democratico de Angola" (PDA) to form the "Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola" (FNLA). By February 1962, the FNLA had merged into an organisation called the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE) with Roberto as its President and Jonas Savimbi as its foreign minister, based in Kinshasa, Zaire. It was recognised by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as Angola's only freedom movement until 1971. Its core membership were Angolan refugees and expatriates in Zaire.

Foreign aid

The United States government began aiding the FNLA in 1961 during the Kennedy administration and rerouted one-third of its official aid to Zaire to the FNLA and UNITA organisations. Over the course of many years, the governments of Algeria, Tunisia, West Germany, Ghana, Israel, France, Romania, the People's Republic of China, South Africa, the United States, Zaire, and Liberia actively supported and aided the FNLA. The French government supplied men and loaned one million pounds sterling without interest. The Israeli government gave aid to the FNLA between 1963 and 1969. Holden Roberto visited Israel during the 1960s, and FNLA members were sent to Israel for training. During the 1970s, the Israeli government shipped arms to the FNLA through Zaire. The People's Republic of China supplied the FNLA with military equipment and at least 112 military advisers in 1974.

Break up of GRAE

By July 1964, GRAE's right as the only liberation movement was challenged with the resignation of the Congolese Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula, their backer, and the departure of Jonas Savimbi, who went on to form his own liberation movement UNITA because of Roberto's dictatorial leadership, unwillingness to accept non-western support and a lack of a political program. Roberto saw off a "coup d'état" in June 1965 by his defence minister and in November of the same year, his brother-in-law, Mobutu Sese Seko, took control of the Congo (later Zaire) in a coup. But by 1968, GRAE's unity had begun to disintegrate.

Nixon's policy to Angola

After Richard Nixon assumed office in 1969, Nixon ordered a review of the United States policy towards Angola, Rhodesia, and South Africa. In January 1970, the National Security Council's Study Memorandum 39 was adopted, which acknowledged that the white regimes in those countries should not be politically and economically isolated and that engaging them was the best means of achieving changes in their systems. This meant a reduction in aid to the FNLA.

Coup in Portugal

In late 1972, the FNLA concluded a ceasefire with the MPLA, which was being attacked by the former in northwest Angola and by the Portuguese in the northeast. In August 1974, the Portuguese Angolan government had proposed a two-year plan for independence with the three groups and white settlers forming a coalition government but this was rejected outright. In order to end the conflict amongst the groups, individual ceasefires were arranged between the groups and the Portuguese Angolan Military Council, with the FNLA signing on 15 October 1974 that allowed it and the other three liberation parties to set up political offices in Luanda. By 25 November 1974, a ceasefire was concluded between the FNLA and UNITA and with the MPLA on 18 December.

Ford's policy to Angola

When Gerald Ford assumed the presidency in August 1974, the new US foreign policy moved away from the National Security Council Study Memorandum 39 to one of support for black rule in Angola as well as passive support for the white rule and so minimal aid was returned to the FNLA. But by November 1974, the US decided they did not want a future government dominated by the pro-Soviet MPLA so the CIA funded the FNLA with $300,000 to help it achieve that objective.

Africa's attempt to mediate

The increasing violence resulted in the gathering of the FNLA and the other two parties in Mombasa, Kenya, from 3–5 January 1975 by the invitation of President Jomo Kenyatta.

Transitional government's failure

Within 24 hours of the Alvor Agreement, fighting broke out in Luanda amongst the FNLA and MPLA with further violence on 23 March when the MPLAs Lopo do Nascimento was subject to an assassination attempt by the FNLA. The transitional government's failure to work was also said to be the result of a lack of interest by the Portuguese government in Angola as it tackled a failed counter-coup in Lisbon by General Spinola and the lack of will of the Portuguese troops to serve in Angola and end the violence between the MPLA and FNLA. The final straw was the dismissal in August of the Portuguese High Commissioner Antonio da Silva Cardoso whose attempt to reign in the MPLA had the support of the FNLA. The FNLA saw its only alternative as a military one after having been expelled from Luanda. On 29 August 1975, the Alvor Agreement was suspended by Portugal except for independence in November, and withdrawal of its troops that signal an escalation of violence for the control of Angola prior to that date.

US covert aid to the FNLA increases

The US government did not believe the Portuguese plan would work and that the MPLA would seize power and install a Soviet-backed regime in power. In addition to the money, the US supplied weapons to Zaire which, in turn, passed them on to the FNLA, and also supplied several thousand troops. With this funding, Roberto believed any future coalition could be abandoned and in doing so the Soviet Union would begin to increase its aid to the MPLA. By June 1975, the CIA requested a meeting with the 40 Committee in which it proposed increased aid for the FNLA. A decision was not made for a month as the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) and U.S. State Department wished to consider the proposal. Assistant Secretary of State Nathaniel Davies objected to further aid, as he believed it would not help the FNLA to become as militarily strong as the MPLA except with massive amounts of money; escalate Soviet and Cuban involvement and feared South Africa would intervene and this would have negative diplomatic connotations for the United States in Africa, so the only option was a diplomatic solution. Henry Kissinger ensured that the NSC viewpoint prevailed and that aid, not diplomacy could prevent an MPLA win so aid of $14 million was approved for the FNLA and UNITA in July and that increased to $25 million in August and reached $32 million by September. The assistance became known as Operation IA Feature. The CIAs covert plan begun sending supplies to the FNLA through Zaire and Zambia and was able to supply by November 1975, 12 APC, 50 SAMs, 1000 mortars, 50,000 rifles and machine guns, 100,000 grenades, 25 million rounds of ammunition, 60 trucks, trailers, boats, radios, spare parts, medicine and food with training by retired US military advisors and five spotter planes as well as mercenaries. The CIA appointed John Stockwell to manage the Angolan Task Force but found that many members of the CIA doubted the FNLAs ability to beat the MPLA and this was confirmed when he visited Angola and discovered the lack of political support for the organisation and also feared any entry of South African forces in Angola would undermine the United States diplomatically in Africa.

South Africans enter the civil war

On the pretext of attacks around the Calueque hydroelectric facility, the South Africans army entered Angola to defend its interests in the facility and this action developed into Operation Savannah to assist the FNLA and UNITA to gain as much control of southern and central Angola prior to independence day in November. The US appeared to give the green light for the South Africans' covert invasion but this soon changed as their involvement became public knowledge, the US distanced themselves. The South Africans advanced close to Luanda from the south while a small force of South African artillery and advisors supported the FNLA in the north.

FNLA attacks Luanda

Without the control of Luanda on independence day, Roberto saw that the FNLA's international legitimacy would be in doubt. The only 'suitable' attack on Luanda was from the north through Quifangondo. Attacks were carried out by the FNLA on 5 and 8 November 1975 but were repulsed each time by the MPLA. With independence day looming on 11 November 1975, Roberto gave the final order to attack Quifangondo on 10 November unaware that the Cubans had reinforced the positions with troops and new Soviet equipment. Roberto claimed the South African were sending men to help him while the South Africans claimed they warned against a frontal assault but whatever the real story was, the FNLA's final assault on what became known as the Battle of Quifangondo failed disastrously. The MPLA retained Luanda, and Angola gained independence from the Portuguese High Commissioner with Neto declaring the People's Republic of Angola. The FNLA continued its fight inside Angola for another four months.

US aid ceases

On 6 November 1975, CIA Director William Colby appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and briefed them that his organisation had not informed the committee fully on its activities in Angola and the following day, the New York Times released the testimony to the world. By 26 November, Nigeria, against U.S. wishes, had recognised the MPLA government and soon convinced twenty-two other African nations to recognise them too. By December, President Ford and Kissinger decided that the aid to the opposition parties should not be abandoned and the CIA was ordered to draw up further aid plans which would need Senate approval but meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee drew up the Clark Amendment, named after Senator Dick Clark, after his visit to Angola. He concluded that the White House and CIA had lied about their involvement and that the US effort was responsible for dragging the Cubans and South Africans into the country's conflict. The State Department and CIA, unable to stay on message, were unable to convince the House or Senate and on 19 December 1975, the Clark Amendment passed the Senate and covert US aid in Angola ended with the House following suit on 27 January 1976.

FNLA retreats from Angola

The MPLA and Cubans maintained the initiative in Northern Angola after the defeat of the FNLA at Quifangondo with the advances on Caxito and the latter's airbases at Camabatela and Negage. On 11 January 1976, FAPLA and the Cubans captured Ambriz and Ambrizete from the FNLA and then advanced on their headquarters at São Salvador its route defended by foreign mercenaries under Colonel Callan and elements of the FNLA. With Colonel Callan committing atrocities in the fighting including against his own men he was stripped of his command in the FNLA and so mercenary support which had begun the previous December ended and São Salvador was captured on 15 February 1976. The South Africans withdrew from Angola on 27 March 1976 after receiving guarantees from Angola and United Nations on the safety of the installations at the Calueque hydroelectric facility so ending Operation Savannah. Elements of the FNLA that had taken part as South African army's Task Force Zulu, was reformed into 32 Battalion.

Military demise of the FNLA

On 29 February 1976, the Angolan President Agostinho Neto and Zairian President Mobuto Sese Seko met in Brazzaville to sign a non-aggression pact which was meant to see the end of Angola's support for Katangese rebels in their country while the Zairians promised to expel both the FNLA and UNITA from bases in Zaire but the deal did not hold and the Shaba I invasion occurred in March 1977. Elements of the FNLA continued the fight after Roberto left, now called the FNLA-COMIRA (Angolan Military Resistance Committee) but ceased to exist by 1983.

Electoral history

Presidential elections

National Assembly elections

References

References

1. [http://www.fnla.net/projet.html Projet de Societé] {{Webarchive. link. (2010-08-05 , official FNLA website (French and Portuguese))
2. link. (2013-11-03)
3. [https://web.archive.org/web/20080419071220/http://www.cne.ao/ National Electoral Commission website] {{in lang. pt.
4. (1976). "The Lessons of Angola: An Eyewitness Report". The Black Scholar.
5. (April 1976). "The Soviet Union and Angola". African Affairs.
6. Ekaney, Nkwelle. (1976). "Angola : Post-Mortem of a Conflict". Présence Africaine.
7. Wright, George. (1997). "The Destruction of a Nation: United States Policy Towards Angola Since 1945".
8. Liberia and Independent Africa, 1940s To 2012: A Brief Political Profile, 2013. p. 7.
9. AlʻAmin Mazrui, Ali. (1977). "The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa".
10. Walker, John Frederick. (2004). "A Certain Curve of Horn: The Hundred-Year Quest for the Giant Sable Antelope of Angola".
11. Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin. (1988). "The Israeli Connection: Whom Israel Arms and Why".
12. B. MacDonald, Scott. (1993). "European Destiny, Atlantic Transformations: Portuguese Foreign Policy Under the Second Republic: 1974–1992".
13. Wright. (August 2023}} A condition of the ceasefire was it needed more arms as it had no US aid apart from Roberto's CIA retainer, and Neto spoke to the Tanzanians who interceded with the Chinese government.{{rp). "The Destruction of a Nation".
14. (January 1986). "US-Soviet Relations and Angola". Harvard International Review.
15. (March 1980). "Angola Four Years Later". Harvard International Review.