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Harm principle

Moral philosophy principle


Moral philosophy principle

The harm principle holds that the actions of individuals should be limited only to prevent harm to other individuals. John Stuart Mill articulated the principle in the 1859 essay On Liberty, where he argued that "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." An equivalent was earlier stated in France's Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 as, "Liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else; hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except those which assure to the other members of the society the enjoyment of the same rights. These limits can only be determined by law." It finds earlier expression in Thomas Jefferson's 1785 "Notes on the State of Virginia", Query 17 (Religion) in which he writes, "The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others."

John Stuart Mill's formulation

The harm principle was first fully articulated by the English philosopher John Stuart Mill [JSM] (1806–1873) in the first chapter of On Liberty (1859), where he argued that:

Mill also put the harm principle within his list of rights that sprung from liberty. It was found within his list of political rights (political activities that did not involve harm to others) - but also within his non-political liberty rights - his "tastes and pursuits" - activities which did not involve politics and did not involve harm to others:

According to Mill, harm is thus necessary but sometimes insufficient to justify legal coercion.

Broader definitions of harm

In the same essay, Mill further explains the principle as a function of two maxims:

The second of these maxims has become known as the social authority principle.

However, the second maxim also raises the question of broader definitions of harm, including harm to the society. Harm is not limited to harm to another individual but can extend to groups or communities, without specifying the affected individuals.

This is an important principle for the purpose of determining harm that only manifests gradually over time—such that the resulting harm can be anticipated, but does not yet exist at the time that the action causing harm was taken. It also applies to other issues—which range from the right of an entity to discharge broadly polluting waste on private property, to broad questions of licensing, and to the right of sedition.

Harm can also result from a failure to meet an obligation. Morality generates obligations. Duty may be exacted from a person in the same way as a debt, and it is part of the notion of duty that a person may be rightfully compelled to fulfill it.

Criticism

Stewart Hamish has argued that the harm principle does not provide a narrow scope of which actions count as harmful towards oneself or the population and that it cannot be used to determine whether people can be punished for their actions by the state. A state can determine whether an action is punishable by determining what harm the action causes. If a morally unjust action occurs but leaves no indisputable form of harm, there is no justification for the state to act and punish the perpetrators for their actions. The harm principle has an ambiguous definition of what harm specifically is and what justifies a state to intervene.

Ben Saunders has also said that the harm principle does not specify on whether the state is justified with intervention tactics. The ambiguity can lead a state to define what counts as a harmful self-regarding action at its own discretion. That freedom might allow for an individual's own liberty and rights to be in danger. It would not be plausible for a state to intervene with an action that will negatively affect the population more than an individual. The harm principle scope of usage has been described as too wide to follow directly and to implement possible punishment by a state.

References

Bibliography

References

  1. (17 April 2008). "Freedom of Speech".
  2. {{cite wikisource. Mill. John Stuart. (1869)
  3. "Amendment I (Religion): Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Query 17, 157--61".
  4. Mill, John Stuart. (1859). "On Liberty". [[Oxford University]].
  5. Menezes Oliveira, Jorge. (2012). "Harm and Offence in Mill's Conception of Liberty". [[University of Oxford]].
  6. (December 1977). "John Stuart Mill on the liberty of the mentally ill: a historical note". American Journal of Psychiatry.
  7. (2008). "The Encyclopaedia of Libertarianism". [[SAGE Publications]].
  8. (2016). "2016 Platform". Libertarian National Committee.
  9. Rossi, Philip J.. (2012). "The Social Authority of Reason". [[SUNY Press]].
  10. Stewart, Hamish. (2009-08-23). "The Limits of the Harm Principle". Criminal Law and Philosophy.
  11. Saunders, Ben. (2016-08-30). "Reformulating Mill's Harm Principle". Mind.
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