East Indies Fleet

Background

Until the Second World War, the Indian Ocean had been a British "lake". It was ringed by significant British and Commonwealth possessions and much of the strategic supplies needed in peace and war had to pass across it: i.e. Persian oil, Malayan rubber, Indian tea, Australian and New Zealand foodstuffs. Britain also used Australian and New Zealand manpower; hence, safe passage for British cargo ships was critical.

At the outbreak of war, Nazi Germany's Kriegsmarine used auxiliary cruisers (converted merchant ships) and the "pocket battleship" to threaten the sea lanes and tie down the Royal Navy. In mid-1940, Italy declared war and their vessels based in Italian East Africa posed a threat to the supply routes through the Red Sea. Worse was to come when the Japanese declared war in December 1941 and, after Pearl Harbor, the sinking by air attack of the battleship and battlecruiser , and the occupation of Malaya, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, there was an aggressive threat from the east.

This threat became a reality during the Indian Ocean raid when an overwhelming Japanese naval force operated in the eastern Indian Ocean, sinking an aircraft carrier and other warships, and disrupting freight traffic along the Indian east coast. At this stage, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke wrote of the situation in 14 April 1942:

We were at the time literally hanging on by our eye-lids! Australia and India were threatened by the Japanese, we had temporarily lost control of the Indian Ocean, the Germans were threatening Iran and our oil, Auchinleck was in precarious straits in the desert, and the submarine sinkings were heavy.

Early war years

Until 1941, the main threat to British interests in the region was the presence of German commerce raiders (auxiliary cruisers) and submarines. The fleet had trade protection as its first priority and was required to escort convoys and eliminate the raiders. The Germans had converted merchant ships to act as commerce raiders and allocated supply ships to maintain them. The location and destruction of these German raiders consumed much British naval effort until the last raider – Michel – was sunk in October 1943.

On 10 June 1940, the entry of Italy into the war introduced a new threat to the oil supply routes from the Persian Gulf, which passed through the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. The Italians controlled ports in Italian East Africa and Tianjin, China. The Italian Royal Navy (Regia Marina) presence in the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and the western Pacific Ocean consisted of destroyers, submarines, and a small number of armed merchantmen. The majority of these were based at Massawa in Eritrea as part of the Italian Red Sea Flotilla, including seven destroyers and eight submarines. Damage to British destroyers at this time included which was crippled by Italian shore batteries.

The Italian naval forces in East Africa were caught in a vice. To put to sea invited heavy British reaction, while to stay in ports threatened by British and Commonwealth forces became impossible. In 1941, during the East African Campaign, these ports were captured by the British.

Singapore

Before the fall of Singapore, the Eastern Fleet's naval base at Singapore (HM Naval Base) was part of the British Far East Command. British defence planning in the area was based on two assumptions. The first was that the United States would remain as an effective ally in the western Pacific Ocean, with a fleet based at Manila, which would be available as a forward base for British warships. Secondly, the technical capabilities and aggression of the Imperial Japanese Navy were underestimated. In these circumstances, with the Japanese fleet engaged by the United States Navy (USN), the Admiralty planned to send four Revenge-class battleships to Singapore to provide defensive firepower and a British presence. The British assumptions were destroyed on 7 December 1941: the impact of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor denied substantial USN support to the British defence of the "Malay barrier" and made impossible the relief of American garrisons in the Philippines. Furthermore, Japanese capabilities exceeded expectations.

After the fall of France in June 1940, Japanese pressure on the Vichy authorities in French Indochina resulted in the granting of base and transit rights, albeit with significant restrictions. Despite this, in September 1940, the Japanese launched an invasion of that country. The bases thus acquired in Indochina allowed extended Japanese air cover of the invasion forces bound for Malaya and for the Dutch East Indies. In these circumstances, Prince of Wales and Repulse, which were dispatched to intercept the invasion force, were vulnerable to concerted air attacks from the Japanese bases in Indochina and, without their own air cover, they were sunk in December 1941.

After the sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse, Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton assumed command of the Eastern Fleet. The fleet withdrew first to Java and, following the fall of Singapore, to Trincomalee, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka).

Indian Ocean retreat

Roskill writes in the War at Sea, Vol. II that:

Admiral Somerville arrived at Colombo on the 26th of [March 1942], and he then took over command of the Eastern Fleet from Admiral Layton. His fleet consisted of the two large carriers Indomitable and Formidable, the small carrier , the battleships Warspite (recently returned from repairing battle damage received off Crete in America), Resolution, Ramillies, Royal Sovereign and Revenge, two heavy and five light cruisers (including the Dutch Heemskerck), sixteen destroyers and seven submarines.

On 31 March Somerville decided to divide the Fleet into two: Force A and Force B. Force A consisted of the battleship , the aircraft carriers , and , and three cruisers. Force B was based around the slow Revenge-class battleships of the 3rd Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Algernon Willis. Neither individually nor together could the two Eastern Fleet forces challenge a determined Japanese naval assault.

When Admiral Somerville inspected the base at Trincomalee, its deficiencies were clear to him. He found the port inadequate, vulnerable to a determined attack, and open to spying. An isolated island base with a safe, deep anchorage in a suitably strategic position was required. Addu Atoll, southernmost of the Maldives in the Indian Ocean, 600 miles southwest of Ceylon, met the requirements and it was secretly developed as a fleet anchorage.

Following the Japanese capture of the Andaman Islands, the main elements of the Fleet retreated to Addu Atoll. On 7 April Somerville was given discretion by the Admiralty to send the slow Revenge-class battleships of Force B all the way back to Kilindini in East Africa, relatively safe from Japanese attack. The Indian Ocean raid by Chuichi Nagumo cost the Fleet the carrier Hermes, the cruisers and , the Australian destroyer , and two tankers. Beyond the withdrawal of Force B, the Admiralty warned that Colombo could not be used for the present. Somerville kept Force A in Indian waters "to be ready to deal with any attempt by the enemy to command those waters with light forces only."

Later, the fleet in the Indian Ocean was then gradually reduced to little more than a convoy escort force as other commitments called for the more modern, powerful ships. In May 1942, the Eastern Fleet supported the invasion of Madagascar, Operation Ironclad. It was aimed at thwarting any attempt by Japanese vessels to use naval bases on the Vichy French controlled territory. During the invasion, vessels of the Eastern Fleet were confronted by vessels of the French Navy and submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

From October 1943, the Eastern Fleet was the maritime component of South East Asia Command, including responsibilities beyond the SEAC area. The fleet reached full operational strength again by 1944. On 22 November 1944 the Eastern Fleet was split into the British Pacific Fleet, receiving the majority of the ships, and the remnant, which became known as the East Indies Fleet.

Apart from the Eastern Fleet battle forces, it also included a submarine force, to hinder Japan from using sea lanes between Burma and Singapore; and a large supporting escort force, responsible for protecting convoy roues between Suez (Red Sea) and India, and between the Cape of Good Hope and India.

The Eastern Fleet included, from time to time, as well as British warships, a number of warships from the British Dominions of Australia and New Zealand as well as other Allied nations, such as the French battleship Richelieu, other ships from the Free French Naval Forces, the Netherlands, and the United States.

Allied Indian Ocean strikes

After the departure of the main battle forces during February 1942, the Indian Ocean was left with mostly escort carriers and older battleships as the core of its naval forces. Allied advances in the Mediterranean and northern Europe during 1943 and 1944, however, released naval resources. As a result, more British aircraft carriers entered the area; added to the force were the battlecruiser , the battleships , , and supporting warships. Preparations were put in hand for a more aggressive stance in the Indian Ocean and for British naval participation in the wide spaces of the Pacific Ocean. Agreement had been reached, after objections from Admiral Ernest King USN, but new procedures would need to be learnt by naval crews and Fleet Air Arm (FAA) aircrew. To this end, Operation Diplomat, a training exercise, took place in late March 1944. The objective was for the fleet to rendezvous with a group of tankers (escorted by the Dutch cruiser ) and practice refuelling at sea procedures. The ships then rendezvoused with United States Navy Task Group 58.5, the aircraft carrier and three destroyers.

Admiral King requested that, during April, the Eastern Fleet should engage Japanese forces in their area and hold them there to reduce the opposition to an American seaborne assault on Hollandia and Aitape on the north coast of Netherlands New Guinea. In response, the Fleet, including Task Group 58.5, carried out Operation Cockpit, an air attack on Sabang, off Sumatra. Surprise was achieved: military and oil installations were heavily damaged by the attacks, aggravating Japanese fuel shortages. The American involvement was extended to capitalise on the success with a second attack, this time on Surabaya, eastern Java, on 17 May (Operation Transom). The distances for this operation necessitated replenishment at sea. Again, the defenders were unprepared and significant damage was inflicted on the port and its military and oil infrastructures. Saratoga and her destroyers returned to the Pacific from 18 May after what Admiral Somerville called "a profitable and very happy association of Task Group 58.5 with the Eastern Fleet".

At the end of August 1944, Admiral Somerville was relieved as Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet by Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, former Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet.

On 15–16 May 1945, the British fought the Battle of the Malacca Strait; the 26th Destroyer Flotilla (composed of , , , and ) sank the Japanese heavy cruiser in the Malacca Straits using torpedoes.

Eastern Fleet senior officers

Commanders-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet

Vice-Admiral Commanding, 3rd Battle Squadron & Second-in-Command, Eastern Fleet

Chief of Staff, Eastern Fleet

Rear-Admiral, Eastern Fleet Aircraft Carriers

This officer supervised the Fleet's aircraft carriers and naval air stations. Air stations included RNAS China Bay (Trincomalee), RNAS Colombo Racecourse (HMS Bherunda), Coimbatore, and RNAS Katukurunda.

Flag Officer Commanding, Red Sea and Canal Area, 1943–44

Flag Officer, East Africa and Admiral Superintendent, H.M. Dockyard, Kilindini

Responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, from April 1942 to September 1943 then transferred back under the East Indies Fleet.

With the Flag Officer, East Africa, was the Commodore, Naval Air Stations, East Africa, which was within the Eastern Fleet command from April 1942 to September 1943 then was transferred back to the East Indies Fleet.

Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf

The Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf was responsible for administering Royal Navy ships and establishments in the Persian Gulf. He was initially located at Basra, in Mandatory Iraq, then later at in Bahrain from 1901 to 1972. His command was part of the East Indies Station, then the Eastern Fleet, then the East Indies Fleet.

There were also Naval Officers-in-Charge at Basra and for the Hormuz.

Flag Officer, Malaya

The Flag Officer, Malaya commanded naval forces and establishments in Malaya including HMNB Singapore.

Naval Officers in Charge, ports and bases

Included:

• Naval Officer-in-Charge, Chittagong
• Naval Officer-in-Charge, Seychelles
• Naval Officer-in-Charge, Diego Suarez
• Naval Officer-in-Charge, Trincomalee

East Indies Fleet senior officers

Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Fleet

Rear-Admiral, Commanding, 5th Cruiser Squadron and Second-in-Command, East Indies Fleet/Far East Fleet

Chief of Staff, East Indies Fleet

Flag Officer, (Air), East Indies Fleet

This officer commanded the aircraft carriers and the naval air stations.

Commodore (D), Commanding, Destroyer Flotillas, Eastern Fleet (and later East Indies Fleet)

Flag Officer, Ceylon, 1942–46

Flag Officer Commanding, Royal Indian Navy

The Royal Indian Navy came under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, on the outbreak of the Second World War and reverted to a separate command after the Japanese surrender.

In addition to the Vice-Admiral commanding, Rear-Admiral Oliver Bevir served as Senior Officer, Royal Naval Establishments, India, from June 1944 to July 1945.

Flag Officer, Malaya and Forward Areas

Main article: Flag Officer, Malaya and Forward Areas

Subordinate naval formations

Units that served in the two fleets included:

Notes

References

• Watson, Dr Graham (2015). "Royal Navy Organisation and Ship Deployment 1947-2013". www.naval-history.net. Gordon Smith.

References

1. Jackson, p. 289
2. "THE BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET IN 1945 A Commonwealth effort and a remarkable achievement". Royal Australian Navy.
3. Chew, Emrys. (25 October 2007). "Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: The Indian Ocean and the Maritime Balance of Power in Historical Perspective". S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.
4. (23 April 2000). "Pearl Harbor Attack CINCPAC (Admiral Chester Nimitz) to CINCUS (Admiral Ernest J. King) DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY SHIPS AS A RESULT OF THE JAPANESE RAID, DECEMBER 7, 1941.".
5. Lord Alanbrooke. (2015). "Alanbrooke War Diaries 1939-1945". Orion.
6. Muggenthaler, p. 282–287
7. O'Hara, p.103
8. (25 April 1941). "South Africans Won the Race to Addis Ababa". [[William Berry, 1st Viscount Camrose.
9. Jackson, p.290
10. "The Intelligence Failure at Pearl Harbor".
11. "L'Indochine française pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale".
12. Shores, et al., pp. 120–21
13. [[Stephen Roskill]], War at Sea, [https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-RN-II/UK-RN-II-1.html#map4 Vol. II], p.22
14. Roskill, Vol. II, 25; [http://pacific.valka.cz/forces/rn.htm Royal Navy in Pacific and Indian Oceans area]
15. [[Stephen Roskill]], War at Sea, [https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-RN-II/UK-RN-II-1.html Vol. II], p.25
16. Roskill, Vol. II, pp.27-28.
17. Roskill, Vol. II, p.29.
18. "Battle of Madagascar".
19. "Royal Navy Organisation in World War 2, 1939–1945: EASTERN FLEET 1.1942-EAST INDIES FLEET 11.44-". Gordon Smith, 19 September 2015.
20. Waters, S. D.. (1956). "The Royal New Zealand Navy". Historical Publications Branch, Royal New Zealand Navy.
21. Jackson, p. 303
22. Waters, S. D.. (1956). "The Royal New Zealand Navy". Historical Publications Branch, Royal New Zealand Navy.
23. Whitaker's Almanacks 1941 – 1971
24. Mackie p151–152
25. Mackie p 152
26. Mackie, p153
27. (December 1942). "The Navy List". H. M. Stationery Office.
28. (December 1942). "The Navy List". H. M. Stationery Office.
29. (November 1944). "The Navy List". H. M. Stationery Office.
30. Mackie p 151–152
31. (2002). "British Admirals of the Fleet: 1734–1995". Pen and Sword.
32. "Royal Navy (RN) Officers 1939–1945 – M". Houterman and Kloppes.
33. "Royal Navy (RN) Officers 1939–1945 – B". Houterman and Kloppes.
34. [http://www.kcl.ac.uk/lhcma/locreg/MADDEN1.shtml Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives]
35. [http://www.vrb.gov.au/service_eligibility/syd-53-11.pdf HMAS Sydney Record of Proceedings November 1953]
36. [http://www.kcl.ac.uk/lhcma/locreg/GLADSTONE.shtml Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives]
37. Mackie p153
38. (October 1944). "The Navy List". H. M. Stationery Office.
39. (19 September 2015). "Royal Navy Organisation in World War 2, 1939–1945: EASTERN FLEET 1.1942-EAST INDIES FLEET 11.44-". Gordon Smith.
40. (19 September 2015). "Royal Navy Organisation in World War 2, 1939–1945: 3.3 Indian and Pacific Oceans". Gordon Smith.
41. (12 July 2015). "Royal Navy Organisation and Ship Deployment 1947–2013:1. ROYAL NAVY ORGANISATION AND DEPLOYMENT FROM 1947". Gordon Smith.